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Key points
1. Kaliningrad oblast is a Russian exclave surrounded by the European Un-
ion. Because of its special geopolitical situation, on the one hand it is part of 
the Russian legal, political and economic framework, while on the other it 
is physically separated from the rest of the Russian Federation, with all the 
consequences of that fact. The ‘insular’ location of this region influences 
the model of its economy, which heavily relies on imports and is focused 
on foreign co-operation. Its specific location also affects the mindset of this 
region’s residents, who perceive themselves as a part of the Russian nation 
but at the same time have a sense of their separate identity, which is mani-
fested in their openness towards Europe and their greater activeness and 
entrepreneurship in comparison to the rest of the Russian nation.
2. As a subject of the Russian Federation, Kaliningrad must adhere to the 
rules and solutions established by the central government, and all deci-
sions regarding this region’s most vital issues are taken in Moscow. The 
priority of Russian regional policy is preventing potential threats to the 
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, which in the case of Kalin-
ingrad oblast primarily means not allowing its bonds with the rest of the 
country to weaken. Moscow’s policy towards this region is first of all aimed 
at compensating it for its separation from the rest of Russia. In effect, the 
oblast receives numerous benefits in the form of financial aid and economic 
privileges. However, Moscow’s oversensitivity to issues which could pose 
challenge to Russia’s integrity is at odds with Kaliningrad’s desire to be-
come more open to the EU neighbourhood, and in some cases has limited 
the region’s economic potential. This is making the oblast a kind of  a ‘cap-
tive island’.
3. Both the political elites and the public in Kaliningrad have demonstrated 
their willingness to enhance co-operation with their neighbours in the EU. 
From Kaliningrad’s point of view, it would be beneficial not only to develop 
economic relations but also to intensify people-to-people contacts, includ-
ing unrestricted travel, to which the introduction of a local border traffic 
regime between Kaliningrad oblast and Poland may contribute. From the 
perspective of the European Union, Kaliningrad is not an independent 
partner for co-operation, but only one element of the EU’s relations with 
the Russian Federation as a whole. However, the island-like situation of 
Kaliningrad oblast makes it a distinct question in EU policy, especially re-
garding transit and visa issues, as well as aid programmes. In the opinion 
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of the authors of this report, the European Union’s more intensive activity 
in Kaliningrad oblast in response to this region’s aspirations is feasible and 
would be beneficial to both parties. This region will remain surrounded by 
the EU, and it will still share numerous practical issues with its neighbours 
which need to be resolved together, for example in the area of ecology. De-
veloping the oblast and bringing it up to living standards similar to those in 
the neighbouring EU member states would contribute to building a stable 
and safe neighbourhood for the EU, something which is especially impor-
tant for Poland and Lithuania.
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introduction
The purpose of this publication is to present the special features of Kalinin-
grad oblast, the Russian exclave1 inside the European Union. This analysis of 
the current situation in this region is intended to help finding a model of co-
operation between the EU and this region which would take both its potential 
and its limitations into account.
The report has been divided into two parts: the first section (chapters 1–3) con-
cerns the current situation in Kaliningrad and its relations with Moscow. The 
first chapter characterises the current political, economic and social situation 
in Kaliningrad oblast, the second chapter assesses Moscow’s policy towards 
the region, and the third specifies the interests of this region and of the federal 
centre and indicates the conflicts between them. The second section of the re-
port outlines the region’s co-operation and contacts with its its EU neighbour-
hood. The text concludes with a chapter containing recommendations for EU 
partners of areas of possible co-operation with the region, using contacts at 
both the federal and regional levels.
1 Formally, Kaliningrad oblast, which has access to the Baltic Sea, should be defined as a semi-
exclave (from the perspective of the Russian Federation) and a semi-enclave (from the per-
spective of the European Union). However, for the needs of this text, the authors have used 
the term ‘exclave/enclave’ with regard to this region, as do most experts who write about 
Kaliningrad oblast. 
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i. KALininGrAd oBLAst: A suBJect or An oBJect  
oF tHe FederAtion?
1. tHe AMBer isLAnd: Kaliningrad today
1.1. Kaliningrad in the legal, political and economic space  
of the russian Federation
Kaliningrad oblast, as one of the 83 federal subjects of the Russian Federa-
tion, is bound by the same legal regulations as all Russian regions. As with 
the remaining Russian federal subjects, the status of Kaliningrad oblast is de-
termined by the constitution of 1993, the statute adopted by the regional par-
liament in 19962, and other legal acts which regulate specific areas of socio-
economic life (codes and federal laws). However, it is the practical governance 
and the regional policy adopted by the central government which is of key sig-
nificance for this region. Back in the 1990s Russia witnessed processes of de-
centralisation due to the weakness of the central government and severe eco-
nomic problems. Leaders of numerous Russian regions, including Kaliningrad 
oblast, demonstrated their political ambitions at that time, enjoying signifi-
cant independence (for example, establishing their own foreign contacts) and 
successfully lobbied in Moscow for political and economic decisions beneficial 
to themselves and their regions (for example, concerning the extraction of raw 
materials, the distribution of taxes, etc.). Since 2000, when Vladimir putin 
was first elected president of russia, the policy of centralising power has 
been applied to Kaliningrad oblast, as to the other russian regions. In this 
period, the most important legislative changes that have affected Kaliningrad 
oblast were as follows:
– the financial reform of 2001, which deprived the regions of some of the direct 
revenues from taxes (these were transferred to the federal budget3), and in ex-
change introduced a mechanism for granting them subsidies and subventions. 
As a consequence, the regions’ financial situation has become more dependent 
2 The text of the statute is available at http://duma39.ru/region/ustav.php
3 The regions lost control of the redistribution of part of their incomes from VAT, social in-
surance and the road fund (at present, 99% of PIT remains in the regions, and all revenues 
from VAT go to the central budget). It is worth noting that only part of the subsidies are 
granted under federal budget acts, while a greater part is transferred to the regions on the 
basis of decisions taken by the government and individual ministries. As a consequence, 
the regions do not know how much funds they will receive from the centre at the time they 
are drawing up their budgets for the next year. 
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on decisions taken in Moscow. The federal budget received almost US$1 billion 
in taxes and duties collected in Kaliningrad oblast in 2010, while the revenues 
(including from taxes) which went directly to the budget of the oblast itself 
were slightly over US$500 million. The region got less than US$400 million 
back in the form of subsidies, subventions and donations. According to data 
from Kaliningrad oblast’s Finance Ministry, subsidies, subventions, donations 
and transfers accounted for 40% of the oblast’s budget incomes. This assured 
the region a medium position in the ranking of Russian regions. However, 
when calculated per capita, Kaliningrad is among the ten regions receiving 
least support from the federal budget4. The dependence of the regional budget 
on the central government increased in the first nine months of 2011 by up to 
61% (the oblast received around US$350 million from Moscow, i.e. 34% more 
than a year before);
– the process of adjusting regional laws to federal legislation, for example, the 
elimination of provisions which contradict legislation at the federal level (in 
the 1990s, some federal subjects introduced provisions into their legal acts 
which were contrary to federal law, concerning such issues as special autono-
my, or even ‘sovereignty’, as was the case with Tatarstan);
– the introduction of a new administrative division of the Russian Federation 
in 2001: the creation of the federal districts (each of which encompasses more 
than ten regions) led by presidential envoys (plenipotentiary representatives), 
whose real competences were much broader than their formal powers (moni-
toring and advising). Kaliningrad oblast became part of the North-Western 
Federal District (FD), with its administrative centre in Saint Petersburg, and 
the envoy in charge of the FD had a representative in Kaliningrad;
– changes in the election procedure concerning the heads of the regions: in-
stead of being elected in general elections, between  2005 and 2012 they were 
nominated by the president upon motion from regional parliaments, where 
the ‘party of the ruling class’, United Russia, predominates. The liquidation 
of elections for heads of regions enabled the Kremlin to replace the previous 
4 In 2011, Kaliningrad oblast received 1894 roubles of subsidies per capita from the federal 
budget. The least-subsidised regions include the prosperous Krasnoyarsk krai (1044 rou-
bles per capita) and Sverdlovsk oblast (997 roubles), and also such poor regions as Kaluga 
oblast (1066 roubles) and Vologda oblast (1572 roubles). Kaliningrad is far behind the lead-
ing recipients of federal aid: Chechnya (13,021 roubles), Yakutia (42,998 roubles) and the 
record-breaking Kamchatka krai (86,957 roubles). See Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16 November 
2010, http://www.ng.ru/Economy/2010-11-16/1_dotacii.html
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governors with people who were more loyal to Moscow. As a consequence, 
Georgy Boos, a trusted aide of then-President Putin, was nominated governor 
of Kaliningrad oblast in 2005; in 2010 he was replaced by Nikolay Tsukanov, 
a member of the local branch of United Russia5;
– regional political parties and blocs have ceased to exist and have been replaced 
with the regional structures of the federal political parties. As a consequence, 
only officially registered parties may take part in elections (previously, the 
participants of elections included blocs of parties with political movements), 
and the regional groupings existing in the oblast have been proscribed (such 
as the Baltic Republican Party in 2005).
As one of the Russian regions, Kaliningrad oblast is also subject to the eco-
nomic regulations adopted by the federal centre, which cover, for example, the 
customs and budget codes, international agreements, acts and decrees which 
set the rules for running business and investing in Russia as a whole. The fed-
eral government also decides on granting economic preferences to a region, 
such as the creation of a Special Economic Zone in Kaliningrad oblast, or of-
fering transport relief. It is also up to Moscow to decide on the implementa-
tion of large infrastructural projects in the oblast (for example, by granting 
funds), such as the construction of a power plant or the development and mod-
ernisation of road infrastructure. Moscow’s anti-crisis policy, as part of which 
money transfers were increased, was a great support for Kaliningrad oblast. It 
allowed the region to balance up its budget and meet its financial obligations 
in 20096. The federal regulations offer some limited autonomy to the regional 
government: for example, it can create a system of incentives for investors by 
offering them tax allowances7, assistance in finding land for investment, easier 
access to infrastructure, or simplified administrative procedures.
5 The procedure of direct elections of the heads of the regions was reinstated in June 2012, al-
though numerous restrictions have been introduced in this process, allowing the Kremlin 
to sustain control over the governor elections. 
6 For example, Moscow granted 4 billion roubles to Kaliningrad oblast in summer 2009 to 
enable the regional aviation company KD Avia, which was about to go bankrupt, to pay out-
standing wages. 
7 According to the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, the regions are free to set the rates 
of regional taxes, including transport tax and corporate property tax, and also to lift part of 
the federal taxes which go to the regional budgets, for example, the 20% corporate income 
tax; 18 percentage points of this tax go to the regional budget, and the region may reduce it 
by 4.5 percentage points. 
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On the other hand, even though in terms of applicable laws Kaliningrad 
oblast is governed by the same regulations as the other regions, its small 
area and unique location (as an exclave surrounded by EU member states) 
mean that some standard regulations have non-standard consequences 
in the case of this oblast, and result in tighter control by the central gov-
ernment. One of non-standard aspects in the case of Kaliningrad has been 
Moscow’s staffing policy. It is a rare practice across the Russian Federation to 
nominate as governor a politician from outside a given region, as has taken 
place in Kaliningrad oblast (the aforementioned nomination of Georgy Boos, 
a Moscow-based politician with no links whatsoever with Kaliningrad). As 
a result, Boos did not identify himself with the region and was loyal to Moscow, 
and therefore focused on supporting big federal business in the region (at the 
expense of local businesses) and reinforcing the central government’s control 
of this region8.
The essential role Kaliningrad oblast plays in the russian security policy has 
also had non-standard consequences for the oblast itself. Kaliningrad is the 
westernmost region of Russia, which borders on EU and NATO member states. 
Also, Kaliningrad is the only Russian ice-free port on the Baltic Sea. The con-
centration of military units in Kaliningrad oblast is among the highest in Rus-
sia, which – given its small area, low population density and separation from 
the rest of the country – makes the military factor here much more important 
than in other regions of the Russian Federation. Kaliningrad oblast is seen in 
Moscow as an essential element of Russia’s military potential. Numerous army 
and fleet units which report directly to the relevant federal ministries are sta-
tioned here9. The command of the Baltic Fleet is located in Kaliningrad oblast, 
which is part of the Western Military District. Additionally, fleet units (in-
cluding four ship brigades), an armoured brigade, a marine infantry brigade, 
8 The regulations imposing an obligation on officials to seek special consent from Moscow for 
foreign official trips were enforced during Georgy Boos’s rule. Although no formal ban or 
restrictions on such trips had been imposed, officials admitted off the record that Moscow 
was ill-disposed towards regional officials’ contacts with their neighbours from the EU. 
Therefore, public servants applied for relevant permits relatively rarely, and their official 
contacts with the neighbouring countries were quite limited. Governor Boos himself set 
a negative example in this respect: he did not visit Poland at all, and went to Lithuania only 
once throughout his entire five-year term in office. 
9 Federal ministries do not consult their decisions with the regions’ governments, which 
sometimes complicates regional affairs. For example, the Cup of Three Governors regatta in 
July 2010, organised by the governor of Kaliningrad oblast among others, was unexpectedly 
disturbed by the military exercises of the Baltic Fleet in the Vistula Lagoon, as a result of 
which the Polish yachts taking part in the race were stopped at the Polish-Russian border. 
For more, see http://www.portel.pl/artykul.php3?i=51022
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an artillery brigade and a missile brigade are deployed there. In total, around 
15,000 soldiers are stationed in Kaliningrad oblast (when counted jointly with 
other law enforcement agencies, the number of armed personnel is around 
25,000)10. The oblast’s military potential is also being constantly reinforced as 
part of the modernisation of the Russian armed forces. A Voronezh-DM early-
warning missile defence radar station was put into operation in Kaliningrad 
oblast in December 2011. The programme to modernise the Russian armed 
forces also envisages the deployment of Iskander ballistic missile systems 
(with a range of up to 500 km), capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads, 
in this oblast; preparations for their deployment started in January 2012. In 
turn, in April 2012 the air defence troops stationed in Kaliningrad oblast were 
equipped with S-400 air-defence missile systems (thus this oblast will become 
the second Russian region, after Moscow and environs, to be covered with the 
protection offered by these systems)11. The oblast also has storage facilities for 
tactical nuclear weapons, which means that such weapons can be deployed 
there in a relatively short time.
Since this is a frontier region, a well-developed structure of customs and bor-
der services operates here which also reports to the central federal authorities. 
Kaliningrad oblast has extensive restricted-access zones which in total make 
up as much as one-third of the oblast’s territory (for more see section 2.3.1.).
1.2. current political situation
Nikolay Tsukanov has been the governor of Kaliningrad oblast since August 
2010 (see box 2). Tsukanov was born in this oblast. He was the mayor of Gusev 
(2005–2009) and the head of administration of Gusevsky District (2009–2010) 
and earned a reputation of one of the most efficient officials in the entire Kalin-
ingrad oblast12. Tsukanov has been a member of the ruling party United Rus-
sia for many years, although rather a rank-and-file member (the most senior 
position he has held in the party was that of secretary of the regional political 
council).
10 For example, see warfare.ru
11 For more, see Andrzej Wilk, ‘Iskanders in the Kaliningrad region regardless of the ‘missile 
shield’’, EastWeek no. 281, 1 February 2012, www.osw.waw.pl
12 In 2009, the town of Gusev was recognised by the government of Kaliningrad oblast as the 
best managed municipality in the region. In 2010, Gusev received a governmental prize of 
13.5 million roubles for running the best-managed town in Kaliningrad oblast. 
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The federal political parties have their regional structures in Kaliningrad 
oblast: the ruling party United Russia, and the parties which are believed to be 
the ‘licensed’ opposition, namely the Communist Party of the Russian Federa-
tion, the leftist populist party named A Just Russia (established in 2006 upon 
inspiration from the Kremlin, although it was later persecuted by the govern-
ment) and the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia led by Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky. Structures of the democratic party Yabloko and of the Patriots of 
Russia (a moderately nationalist party which has been dominated by the trade 
union movement in Kaliningrad oblast) also operate here. As in the other re-
gions, United Russia predominates in the local parliament in Kaliningrad (see 
box 1). However a greater political variety, compared to the rest of Russia, is 
characteristic of Kaliningrad oblast. This is manifested through the stronger 
position of the smaller parties (primarily Patriots of Russia) present in Kalin-
ingrad’s parliament than in other regions, and also through the poorer results 
achieved by United Russia than the national average (see chart 1).
As with most of the regions, the regional structures of the large federal po-
litical parties have their characteristic features resulting from the influence 
of local interests. United Russia in Kaliningrad is the party of the local politi-
cal and business elites, and so its activity is affected both by guidelines from 
its headquarters in Moscow and the local interests (including business) of its 
members linked to the region. Sometimes these interests come into conflict13, 
such as for example in the case of visa-free movement between Kaliningrad 
oblast and the European Union: members of the regional United Russia (led by 
the current Governor Nikolay Tsukanov) were appealing for Kaliningrad to be 
made a pilot region in the process of establishing a visa-free regime between 
the European Union and the entire Russian Federation. These appeals have not 
been supported by the federal political elite, who instead have negotiated a lo-
cal border traffic agreement with Poland for Kaliningrad (for more see part I, 
chapter 2.4.1.).
Several political movements exist in the exclave; most of them are inclined to-
wards opposition. As well as the regional structures of federal organisations 
(for example of the liberal and democratic opposition Solidarity movement), 
13 The conflict of interest between the regional structures of political parties and their head-
quarters in Moscow was noticeable, for example, during the protests against the policy 
adopted by Governor Boos and Putin’s government in January 2010: regional sections of the 
Communist Party and the LDPR took part in the protest actions, contrary to recommenda-
tions from their respective party headquarters in Moscow. 
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there are also movements which have emerged in the region itself. The best-
known of them is the Justice movement led by Konstantin Doroshok14. Justice 
declares itself as a movement in opposition to the region’s government. Since 
its emergence in 2008, it has been among the main organisers of protests in 
the region (including the protests in January 2010). The Solidarity and Justice 
movements and the regional structures of the political parties (the CPRF, A Just 
Russia, the LDPR, the Patriots of Russia and Yabloko) have formed the ‘Our Ka-
liningrad’ coalition, which has declared itself as an opposition bloc targeted 
against the political domination of United Russia (in March 2010, this coalition 
was engaged in monitoring the regional parliamentary elections). Numerous 
social organisations also operate in Kaliningrad oblast, in addition to political 
organisations (for more see section 1.5.).
Box 1. parliament of Kaliningrad oblast (elected in March 2011)
United Russia – 24 seats (60% share)*
Communists – 6 seats (15%)
Patriots of Russia – 2 seats (5%)
A Just Russia – 2 seats (5%)
LDPR – 2 seats (5%)
Independent MPs – 4 seats (10%)
(Total – 40 MPs)
* United Russia gained additional MPs thanks to single-member constituencies (mixed voting regu-
lations apply during elections in the region; half of the MPs are elected from party lists and half seek 
election by themselves)
14 The leader of this movement, Konstantin Doroshok, became engaged in protest activity 
when the customs service imposed huge outstanding taxes on him and many other busi-
nessmen who imported used cars, thus forcing them to wind up their businesses. He estab-
lished the Solidarity movement, which since 2008 has organised regular protests against 
the policies of the region’s government, especially regulations unfavourable for small- and 
medium-sized businesses. 
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Box 2. Governors of the oblast
period Governor previous career
Manner of 
election
1991–
1996
Yuri Matochkin
civilian fleet captain, served in 
the Soviet KGB Border Troops
appointed by 
President Boris 
Yeltsin
1996–
2000
Leonid Gorbenko
director of the State-Owned 
Fishing Port in Kaliningrad
elected in a gene-
ral election
2000–
2005
Vladimir Yegorov Baltic Fleet Admiral
elected in a gene-
ral election
2005–
2010
Georgy Boos
a Moscow-based politician,  
a high-ranking member  
of the United Russia party
appointed by Pre-
sident Vladimir 
Putin
since 
2010
Nikolay Tsukanov
a politician who was born in 
Kaliningrad oblast, a member of 
United Russia
appointed by 
President Dmitry 
Medvedev
chart 1. Levels of electoral support for united russia in Kaliningrad 
oblast, and in russia as a whole
Source: Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation
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1.3. the current economic situation
The region’s economic situation is closely linked to the economic situation in 
the rest of Russia. The Russian market is the main outlet for the goods man-
ufactured in the exclave (TV sets, cars, furniture and food). Furthermore, 
Russian companies (predominantly state-owned) are the key investors in the 
region. The exclave’s economy is characterised by a small outlet market (less 
than one million people), low investment potential for global companies, and 
practically complete dependence on supplies (from both Russia and abroad) 
of raw materials, consumer goods and semi-finished products used in the re-
gion’s industry.
The economic crisis has had a very strong negative impact on Kaliningrad’s 
economic situation (in 2009, Gross Regional Product (GRP) fell by 14.9%, 
while the GDP of Russia as a whole fell by 7.8%). Although economic revival 
has been observed since 2010, as in the rest of Russia, the socio-economic 
indicators are returning to the pre-crisis levels quite slowly. The oblast’s 
GRP grew by 7.8% in 2010 and by 7% in 2011 (in comparison to 4% in the Rus-
sian Federation as a whole). According to forecasts, growth will be slower 
in the next years due to the difficult situation on the European and Russian 
markets.
In contrast to the rest of Russia, Kaliningrad oblast has a well-developed 
small business sector (see chart 2). their number in Kaliningrad (23.5 per 
thousand residents) is double the russian average (11), and they gener-
ate aroundup to around 35% of the exclave’s Grp (only 17% in russia as 
a whole). This is a result of the privileges the region had before 2006, which 
allowed for duty-free import of goods to the region, and contributed to the de-
velopment of trade. Yet on the other hand, this is an effect of intensive contacts 
between the region’s residents with their neighbours.
However, the main branches of the region’s economy are trade and indus-
try (assembly plants of goods such as cars and TV sets operate there); each of 
these sectors generates around 20% of GRP (see chart 3 for more details). In 
recent years, together with the development of Kaliningrad’s heating plant and 
plans to build nuclear power station, the importance of big business in the re-
gion has risen noticeably. This is the main driving force behind Kaliningrad 
oblast’s development and the key source of funding for investments. The seven 
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largest businesses (including Avtotor Holding, LUKoil-Kaliningradmorneft 
and TEC-2) account for 20% of the exclave’s GRP15.
Since 2006, large business entities which invest over around US$5 million in 
the region have been offered the possibility to use fiscal and customs privi-
leges until 2031 (in compliance with the law) as part of the Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ) which covers the entire Kaliningrad oblast (for more on the zone 
see chapter I, 2.1.1.). However, the benefits offered have failed to bring about 
a rapid development of the region; around 50 businesses were residents of the 
zone in 2011. Over the five years of the zone’s operation, these businesses have 
only invested around US$120 million in this region, while total investments 
in the region’s basic capital in 2010 reached around US$2 billion. Despite the 
privileges granted to Kaliningrad oblast, it is significantly below the Russian 
average in terms of economic development – its Gross Regional Product (GRP) 
per capita is still at around 60% of the Russian average (see chart 4).
The region is famous first of all for its amber deposits16, since up to 90% of global 
amber reserves are located in this exclave. Amber is predominantly exported 
without having been processed, to the region’s financial detriment.
Agriculture is poorly developed in this region17, and is of low importance for its 
economy (it generates around 6% of GRP). As a result, most of the raw materi-
als necessary for the regional food industry come from outside the oblast. For 
example, the meat industry imports as much as 90% of the raw material. Small 
farms account for almost half of the region’s agricultural production, while the 
remaining part is produced by large agricultural firms (mainly privatised kol­
khozes and sovkhozes).
In 2011, Kaliningrad oblast produced enough power to meet its demand 
for electricity. This was possible because the (gas) heat and power plant 
15 In 2010, investments in the exclave reached 66.7 billion roubles (around US$2.2 billion), i.e. 
almost 15% more than a year before (the value of investments fell by more than 30% in 2009). 
Investments were fuelled mainly by large infrastructural projects, such as the TEC-2, the 
nuclear power plant and the road infrastructure. 
16 In 2010, the Kaliningrad Amber Factory produced 340 tonnes of amber in the region. 
17 Around 60% of arable land was cultivated in 2010. It needs to be noted that part of the land 
is below sea level and requires intensive melioration efforts. 
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TEC-218 had been completed, and its second block had been put into operation in 
December 2010. After the collapse of the USSR, Kaliningrad oblast received as 
much as 80% of the electricity it needed by transit via the networks of the Bal-
tic states from power plants in the Leningrad and Voronezh oblasts. Kalinin-
grad’s energy grid is now (since December 2011) connected with the rest of 
Russia by means of three energy lines (330 kW each) running through Lithu-
ania. The technical possibility of energy transmission is ensured through the 
synchronisation of the Baltic states’ power system with the post-Soviet system 
(IPS/UPS) which operates in Russia. The planned inclusion of the Lithuanian 
network in the European system (ENTSO-E) would cut off Kaliningrad’s grid 
from that of Russia.
As regards the region’s energy needs, the construction of a nuclear power plant 
in Kaliningrad oblast, which Moscow has been pushing through since 2009, 
is of limited significance. Its planned output is higher than the region’s needs. 
Only part of its production could be used in the region, for example to satisfy 
a possible increase in demand for energy and to replace the production of small 
coal heat and power plants which adversely affect the natural environment. 
According to Moscow’s concept, energy from the nuclear power plant would 
be exported, mainly to EU member states (for more on the nuclear power plant 
project, see chapter 2.1.3. and box 5).
Production of electric power in the enclave relies on the following raw materials: 
natural gas19, mazout and coal, all of which are principally supplied from main-
land Russia, in transit via Belarus and Lithuania or by sea. The regional energy 
sector’s dependence on supplies of raw materials is causing some difficulty to the 
region. In the case of gas conflicts between Russia and its neighbours, this may 
lead to shortages of raw materials. This happened in 2004, when Kaliningrad 
was unable to receive gas as a consequence of Moscow cutting off its supplies to 
Belarus. Although the region has its own small oil fields, where the oil company 
18 The electricity deficit was until recently a serious impediment to this region’s economic 
development. The construction of TEC-2 had been ongoing since the early 1990s. The main 
problem was the unwillingness of the key investor, Gazprom, to increase unprofitable gas 
supplies to this region.
19 As TEC-2 has been developed, Gazprom has increased the annual capacity of the gas pipe-
line system used to supply gas to the exclave from 1.5 to 2.5 billion m3, and is also developing 
its gas storage facility in the region. These increased supplies will not only meet the needs of 
the heat and power plant, but also allow the residents to be connected to the network (over 
60% of the residents were connected to the system at the end of 2010).
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LUKoil operates20, as the oblast has no facilities to process this raw material, its 
demand for petroleum products must be satisfied by imports from the rest of 
Russia or from its neighbours, which makes fuel prices higher.
chart 2. small and medium businesses, a break-up into individual 
sectors of Kaliningrad’s economy, value as of 1 october 2010 (in %)
Source: Report on the results and general policies of the government of Kaliningrad oblast in 2010 (DROND 2010)
chart 3. the structure of Kaliningrad oblast’s Grp (in %) in 2010
Source: Report on the results and general lines of activity of the government of Kaliningrad oblast in 
2010 (DROND 2010)
20 The Russian oil company LUKoil extracted over 1.2 million tonnes of oil from the fields on 
land and sea shelf in 2010. Its entire production is exported outside the region. The company 
has also built an oil terminal in Izhevskoye by the Vistula Lagoon, among other projects.
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chart 4. ratio of Kaliningrad oblast’s Grp per capita to the russian Fede-
ration’s Gdp (in %)
Source: Report on the results and general policies of the government of Kaliningrad oblast in 2010 
(DROND 2010) 
The region’s economy is closely linked to foreign markets, and the value of 
trade (excluding trade between Kaliningrad oblast and the other regions of 
Russia) is one and a half times higher than the region’s GRP. This region has 
a vast trade deficit due to its underdeveloped economy and the fact that it is 
used only as a way-station towards the Russian market. Imports account for 
over 90% of the region’s foreign trade (see chart 5). Apart from consumer goods, 
which are necessary to meet the exclave’s needs, a vast majority of the imports 
are semi-finished products which the local assembly plants use to manufac-
ture goods which are then sold in the rest of Russia. Almost 90% of the value 
of imports are generated by the residents of the special economic zone21, who 
have customs privileges. Kaliningrad’s top ten importers (including Avtotor 
and Sodruzhestvo Soya) account for 50% of the value of imported goods. The 
region’s trade structure in terms of goods has not changed significantly. The 
exclave predominantly imports processed goods: electrical and machinery 
products (especially components for the assembly of cars and TV sets), house-
hold chemical products, agricultural and food products, footwear, clothes and 
furniture. Despite their geographical proximity, Poland and Lithuania are not 
among the key suppliers of goods to this region; they have been outstripped not 
only by Germany, China and South Korea, but even by Slovakia (they supply 
components for car assembly; see chart 6).
21 Data from the Ministry of Economy of Kaliningrad oblast; http://economy.gov39.ru/news/
index.php?ID=2664
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The region’s exports in 2011 increased twofold compared with 2010, and there-
fore returned to the pre-crisis value of US$1,3bln. This spectacular export 
growth was achieved mainly owing to an increase in the sales of petroleum 
products (their export value rose six-fold; production from other regions of 
Russia was re-exported from Kaliningrad oblast). Raw materials (around 70%), 
especially the output of the fuel and energy sector (mainly crude oil and petro-
leum products) and cars (although the vast majority of the production goes to 
the Russian market) predominate in exports. Goods from this region are ex-
ported to Germany, Poland, Lithuania, Holland and the United Kingdom.
chart 5. Kaliningrad oblast’s foreign trade 
Source: Ministry of Economy of Kaliningrad oblast, Customs Service of the Russian Federation
chart 6. share of the key trade partners in the exclave’s imports in 2011 (in %)
Source: Ministry of Economy of Kaliningrad oblast
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Kaliningrad oblast is not very popular with foreign investors due both 
to the limitations which are typical of russia as a whole (corruption, in-
sufficient protection of property rights, inefficient courts and changing law) 
and those characteristic of the region (the market’s isolation from the rest 
of Russia and the higher business costs linked to that, namely costs of energy, 
transit and imports). The privileges offered in Kaliningrad are insufficient to 
attract foreign investors. Any foreign capital which is interested in presence 
in the Russian market primarily chooses locations in Russia proper, especially 
in the numerous special economic zones already established (such as Dubna, 
Zelenograd and Skolkovo near Moscow). Several foreign investors have with-
drawn from the region over the past few years, which is proof of the region’s 
declining competitiveness. Two examples are Snaige, the Lithuanian manufac-
turer of refrigerators and coolers (which is planning to launch production in 
Kazakhstan), and the Polish construction firm Budimex, which have already 
wound up their businesses in Kaliningrad oblast. Furthermore, IKEA’s invest-
ment there did not come into effect in 2010 (this Swedish firm decided to de-
velop its presence in the rest of Russia).
As a consequence, total foreign investments in the region at the end of 2010 
were estimated to have reached only around US$800 million (over 20 billion 
roubles), while over US$420 billion was invested at the same time in Russia as 
a whole. Yet it must be noted that the level of foreign investments has been in-
creasing over the past few years. The value of foreign capital invested in Russia 
in 2010 was 80% higher than a year before (2009, being the crisis year), which 
means over US$200 million more, and additionally US$143 million more was 
invested in the first half of 2011. The main investors in this region are Cyprus 
(predominantly Russian capital returning to Russia – 21%), the USA and Po-
land (around 20% each), Denmark (over 10%), Lithuania (almost 9%) and Swi-
tzerland (5%). the indicator for Kaliningrad oblast presenting the value of 
foreign investments per capita is equivalent to only one-third of the aver-
age russian value (see chart 7).
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chart 7. Foreign investments per capita in Kaliningrad oblast  
and the russian Federation 
Source: Report on the results and general policies of the government of Kaliningrad oblast in 2010 
(DROND 2010) 
1.4. the social situation
The social situation in the region is more difficult than in Russia on average. 
This is principally a result of the costs related to the separation of the regional 
economy from the rest of the country, and of its reliance on imports, which 
results in high prices. This difficult situation has deteriorated further due to 
the global economic crisis, which affected Kaliningrad oblast especially se-
verely. In December 2009, the unemployment rate in the region reached 10.9% 
(in comparison to 8.4% on average in the Russian Federation), and was among 
the highest in the European part of Russia. The wage arrears were also among 
the highest in this region, which more than tripled during 2009 (to 470 million 
roubles, or US$15.6 million)22.
22 Source: Rosstat.
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The social situation has been improving since 2010, although most indicators 
have not returned to the pre-crisis levels and are still below the Russian av-
erage. The unemployment rate continues to be quite high (the average rate in 
September-November 2011 was 9.7%, compared to 6.2% on the average in the 
Russian Federation)23. People’s real incomes are gradually growing (in 2010 by 
2.6%). The value of outstanding wages was also reduced to 74.4 million roubles 
(around US$2.5 million) in December 201124, although the outstanding wage 
indicator is still among the highest in European Russia. Kaliningrad is also 
among the ten regions with the lowest average wage (in January-September 
2011 it was around 19,600 roubles, or US$650, while the average wage in Russia 
is 22,600 roubles)25, while the living costs in Kaliningrad are higher than 
the average in russia. Despite this, the number of residents living below the 
poverty line has been decreasing over the past ten years26. The stratification of 
society in terms of incomes is much smaller in the region in comparison to the 
average levels in Russia as a whole27.
This region has a negative birth rate (in 2010, the number of deaths was around 
3000 higher than the number of births, while in the first nine months of 2011 
this difference was over 100028). However, these losses are compensated for by 
migration. Migrants come to this exclave predominantly from the CIS, mostly 
from Kazakhstan. 3004 people came to settle in Kaliningrad oblast from CIS 
countries and the Baltic states in 2010. The positive migration balance was 3307 
people29. Since January 2007, Kaliningrad oblast (along with other regions of 
Russia) has been engaged in the resettlement programme, which encourages 
23 Ibidem.
24 Ibidem.
25 The average old-age pension in Kaliningrad between January and September 2011 was 7900 
roubles (around US$242), while the average pension in Russia as a whole was 8300 roubles. 
Source: Rosstat. According to surveys carried out by the Kaliningrad Monitoring Group, in 
addition to traditional sources of income, 27% of the residents of this region own a garden 
plot, where they grow fruit and vegetables for their own needs. 31% of all residents of Kalinin-
grad and 40% of pensioners make fruit, vegetable and mushroom preserves every year for the 
winter. 
26 Between 2001 and 2010, the number of such people in Kaliningrad oblast fell from 395,000 
to 126,100 (from 39 to 13.2%). Source: Report from the human rights ombudsman in Kalinin-
grad oblast ‘O soblyudienii prav i svobod cheloveka i grazhdanina v kaliningradskoi oblasti 
za 2010 god’, http://ombudsman39.ru/annual_reports
27 Source: Ministry of Economy of Kaliningrad oblast, http://economy.gov39.ru/socialno-
ekonomicheskoe-razvitie/osnovnye-pokazateli-ser/
28 The average life expectancy in this region is 67.7 years, one year shorter than the Russian 
average (and five years shorter than in Lithuania); Rosstat 2010.
29 Source: Kaliningrad Statistical Office, www.kaliningrad.gks.ru
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former citizens of the USSR to settle in Russia30. The region’s demographic 
problems have been deepened by the difficult healthcare situation: the lack 
of reforms in the healthcare system and insufficient funds allocated from the 
budget31 are restricting access to medical services and are lowering their qual-
ity. There is a growing shortage of physicians and hospital beds in Kaliningrad 
oblast; their number per resident here is among the lowest in the entire Rus-
sian Federation, while in the Soviet period, given the military character of this 
region, its healthcare system was one of the best-developed in the USSR32. This 
situation is causing many residents to use paid healthcare services in Poland 
and Lithuania, where standards are higher and the charges are lower than 
those offered in paid healthcare within the Kaliningrad region.
Other persistent significant social problems are HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, 
incidences of which are higher than the Russian averages. Nevertheless, it has 
been possible to prevent these diseases from spreading further, compared to 
the 1990s. 98.5 new cases of tuberculosis per 100,000 people were registered in 
2010 in Kaliningrad oblast (82/100,000 in Russia), while in 2006 this number 
was 135. At the same time, tuberculosis mortality has been falling over the past 
few years33. The number of people diagnosed with HIV was 771 per 100,000 in 
Kaliningrad oblast at the end of 2010 (while the average number in Russia is 
413/100,00034). However, it is worth emphasising that European countries in-
vested funds in screening and disease prevention in this region in the 1990s. 
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude clearly whether the higher incidence rate 
concerning these diseases in Kaliningrad oblast reflects a genuinely high oc-
currence of these diseases in comparison to the other regions of Russia, or is 
simply a reflection of better diagnostics.
30 9500 people settled in Kaliningrad oblast as part of this programme by December 2010.
31 The regional healthcare programme for 2009 envisaged such low funds for free healthcare 
in comparison to the federal standards that it was brought to court by the region’s prosecu-
tion authorities. Source: Report from the human rights ombudsman in Kaliningrad oblast 
‘O soblyudienii prav i svobod cheloveka i grazhdanina v kaliningradskoi oblasti za 2009 
god’, http://ombudsman39.ru/annual_reports
32 In 2009, there were 34.8 physicians (50.1 on average in Russia) and 80 hospital beds (97 in 
Russia) per 10,000 residents of the region. In 1990, there were 41.5 physicians (45 on average 
in Russia) and 143 hospital beds (137 in Russia). Source: 2010 Statistical Yearbook, Rosstat. 
33 Source: Report on the results and general policies of the government of Kaliningrad oblast 
in 2010 (DROND 2010), prepared by the Ministry of Economy of Kaliningrad oblast.
34 Our own calculations, on the basis of data from the Russian centre for HIV and AIDS re-
search and policy http://www.hivpolicy.ru/statistic/national/ 
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1.5. characteristics of the Kaliningrad residents
Although a vast majority of residents of Kaliningrad (over 82% according to the 
census conducted in 2002) identify themselves as Russians, they still see them-
selves as residents of a special area, ‘a different Russia in Europe’35. This sense 
of being distinct is an effect of the unusual location of this region – its physi-
cal distance and separation from the rest of Russia, which has a strong impact 
on the identity of the residents of this region, and is forming a community of 
interests which are often unnoticed and unconsidered in Moscow (see box 3).
Box 3. the evolution of Kaliningrad’s historical identity
The residents of Kaliningrad make up a relatively new and constantly 
evolving community. It started to be formed as late as 1945, when the ethnic 
German residents of East Prussia, who had either fled or been displaced, 
were totally replaced by people from various parts of the USSR, many of 
whom were forced to settle in this area. The identity of Kaliningrad’s resi-
dents in the Soviet period and immediately after the collapse of the USSR 
could be defined as ‘Soviet’, the components of which included the varied 
ethnic structure of the residents, their lack of roots in the region, and the 
closed and military character of the region (including the strong army 
presence, who together with their families accounted for up to 30% of the 
oblast’s entire population).
Twenty years since the collapse of the USSR, the historical and social iden-
tity of the residents of this region has visibly evolved. The feeling of aliena-
tion and the lack of ties with the region and its history are gradually being 
replaced with growing interest in the past. The Prussian history of this re-
gion and its legacy is no longer a taboo issue. For example, this is mani-
fested through frequent references to elements of the history of Königs-
berg and East Prussia (omnipresent pre-war photographs and publications 
which present the topography of the towns and habits of their former resi-
dents) and its famous representatives (especially Immanuel Kant), and also 
35 The phrase ‘a different Russia in Europe’ occurs in many surveys and works concerning the 
identity of the residents of Kaliningrad, which reflects their identification with Russia and 
at the same time their sense of regional specificity, distinctness from the rest of Russia and 
proximity to Europe. For example, see M. Berendeyev, ‘Kto my? Kaliningradtsi v poiskakh 
identichnosti’, Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya no. 4/2007, pp. 127-132., S. Ginzburg, ‘Iden-
tichnost v zarubezhnoi Yevrope i v Kaliningrade, http://rugrad.eu/communication/blogs/
blog_Ginzburg/1147/ 
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through care of the monuments, and discussions about reinstating histori-
cal names (including the name of the region’s capital city). In everyday life, 
residents often use the name ‘König’, a Russified reference to the city’s his-
torical German name, both when speaking about Kaliningrad and in the 
names of firms, sports clubs, etc. Extracurricular classes in the history of 
Königsberg are held in many schools.
Interest in the past creates a bond in what is still a strongly diversified so-
ciety in this region. Königsberg’s history is referred to not only by the new 
generation of citizens who were born or raised in Kaliningrad, but also by 
settlers from other regions, including active and retired military person-
nel, to whom the idea of the region’s being part of Europe is not a strange 
concept (military staff were among the groups who regularly travelled 
abroad in the Soviet period, so they fitted in well with the new free-market 
reality after 1991 partly thanks to their trading contacts with Europe).
Furthermore, historical references to the Prussian past – albeit not spoken 
of directly – emphasise the region’s belonging to Europe, and derive from 
the need to intensify contacts with the European Union.
Because Kaliningrad oblast is an exclave, its residents are more open to travel 
to the EU. They tend to contact their neighbours in the EU more often than 
residents of other Russian regions. In 2011, consulates of EU member states 
in Kaliningrad oblast issued around 215,000 visas (out of 941,500 residents of 
the exclave)36. Only 18.5% of the urban population in this region have never 
been abroad, while 8.7% of them go abroad several times a year37. The weakness 
of Kaliningrad’s economy and its heavy reliance on external supplies makes 
goods and services in the neighbouring countries more attractive and competi-
tive. As a consequence, Polish and Lithuanian shopping centres, holiday re-
sorts and clinics are very popular with residents of Kaliningrad oblast, and the 
neighbouring countries are becoming a point of reference for them in terms of 
living standards, including the quality and prices of goods and services.
36 Source: information from the Polish consulate in Kaliningrad. 
37 Data from surveys carried out in 2011 among Russians living in the towns and cities of Ka-
liningrad oblast by Tsentr obshchestvenno-politicheskikh issledovaniy ‘Russkaya Baltika’. 
According to the census of 2002, ethnic Russians make up 82.37% of the region’s population, 
78.5% of the region’s residents live in towns and cities, so the results of the survey can be 
treated as more or less representative of the entire region. 
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Residents of Kaliningrad oblast also visit other regions of the Russian Federa-
tion often: 10% of them go to the rest of Russia several times a year, while less 
than 7% of its urban population do not visit other Russian regions at all38. They 
go to Russia predominantly to visit their families or on business trips, and to 
a lesser extent as tourists or for small-business purposes.
The intensity of external contacts and the region’s dependence on imports 
make this oblast’s residents more active and resourceful than people living in 
other parts of Russia. The Kaliningrad oblast has a well-developed small busi-
ness sector (see part I, chapter 1.3.), and is also russia’s leader in terms of 
public activity: 3.6 non-governmental organisations per thousand resi-
dents operate there, which is clearly above the russian average (2.6 per 
thousand residents)39. Organisations dealing with social issues, protection of 
the natural environment and cultural heritage, youth organisations and those 
devoted to certain professional or hobby groups predominate among the al-
most 3500 NGOs which are registered in this region40. Public and private part-
nerships, as part of which the state co-operates with NGOs in implementing 
social services, function in Kaliningrad oblast, something rare in Russia41. The 
Kaliningrad bloggers have also brought some new quality into public activity. 
They established a discussion club called Amberkant in 2010. This club has 
turned into a platform for exchanging views between young, active and edu-
cated residents of Kaliningrad on the Internet and in real life. It has become 
so popular that invitations to meetings with this club have been accepted by 
Kaliningrad’s governor, Nikolay Tsukanov, and the then speaker of the State 
Duma, Boris Gryzlov, among others.
Despite the clear feeling of distinctness among the residents of Kaliningrad, 
it cannot be said that separatist tendencies exist in this region. They occurred 
for a while in the 1990s, when supporters of the region’s independence such as 
38 Source as above. 
39 Source: Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation http://unro.minjust.ru/NKOs.aspx
40 Lists of non-governmental and social organisations are available on the website of the Ka-
liningrad oblast’s Justice Ministry, http://www.klguprminjust.ru/structure_48 
41 Maria, an association of mothers of handicapped children, entered into a public and private 
partnership with the government of Kaliningrad oblast. Pursuant to an agreement with 
the government, it keeps a dayroom and a rehabilitation centre for handicapped children 
in a former school building in Olekhovo. This association has received foreign grants for 
equipping this facility. 
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the Baltic Republican Party42, few as they were, were still active and noticeable 
in the media. Meanwhile, today even those who held ‘separatist’ views at that 
time only want a certain amount of autonomy for this region and its special in-
terests to be respected in Moscow’s decisions. The most radical proposals from 
autonomy supporters at present are that the exclave should be given the sta-
tus of a separate federal district43. Local activists are also making attempts to 
publicise the oblast’s problems abroad. One example of this is the ‘prisoners of 
Europe’ action, as part of which a number of pickets were held in 2010 in front 
of consulates of the Schengen-area member states in Kaliningrad and in Brus-
sels. The participants demanded that the EU should facilitate visas for resi-
dents of this region. No proposals for formal or real separation of the region 
from the rest of Russia have been mentioned in public debate.
As a consequence of the higher social activity of Kaliningrad’s residents and 
their aspirations inspired by contacts with the international environment, 
the significant deterioration of the living standards in this region in 2009 gave 
rise to public protests. The direct catalyst for the protests were Governor Boos’s 
decisions, for example increasing the rate of the transport tax several times, 
which adversely affected most people in this region. The protest consolidated 
the regional political and business elites and the public. At that time, they were 
the most numerous protests on the scale of Russia as a whole in a decade (up 
to 10,000 people participated in them). Their participants were the first to use 
anti-Putin slogans (for example, they appealed for the dismissal of Vladimir 
Putin’s government). However, it turned out later that the residents’ dissatis-
faction was fuelled mainly by local problems. By resolving some of them, Mos-
cow was able to reduce the resistance potential to such an extent that the wave 
of protests which swept across Russia in December 2011 did not affect senti-
ments in this region (for more details, see box 4).
42 The Baltic Republican Party was established in 1993 by Sergey Pasko, and had several hun-
dred members. This party was banned in 2005, and is now operating as the public move-
ment Respublika, with little impact.
43 At present, the Kaliningrad oblast is part of the North-Western Federal District, whose 
capital city is Saint Petersburg. The authors of the project aimed at winning Kaliningrad 
oblast the status of a federal district are a group of regional politicians led by a member of 
Kaliningrad’s Duma, Solomon Ginzburg. For more, see Nezavisimaya Gazeta, ‘Kenigsbergs-
kiy federalnyi okrug’, 1 August 2011, http://www.ng.ru/regions/2011-08-01/1_kenig.html.
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Box 4. protests in Kaliningrad 
The public protests taking place in Kaliningrad in late 2009/early 2010 were 
unprecedented in their size at that time: five thousand people took to the 
streets in December 2009, and twice as many in January 2010. The protests 
were provoked by socio-economic problems: the residents who participated 
in the protests expressed their dissatisfaction with the rapid deterioration 
of the economic situation, rising taxes and utility charges, and the terrible 
condition of the healthcare system. At the same time, anti-governmental 
political slogans emerged during the protests, including calls to sack the 
then governor, Georgy Boos, and also to remove the central government 
led by Vladimir Putin, an act which broke a political taboo in Russia at the 
time. The protesters also voiced their dissatisfaction with the region’s iso-
lation from the EU, and demanded facilitations in travel to the European 
Union, including cost-free visas.
The direct organisers of the demonstrations were activists who were well-
known in the region: the leader of the Kaliningrad-based movement ‘Jus-
tice’, led by Konstantin Doroshok (a former businessman who imported 
second-hand cars, and was forced to wind up his business under pressure 
from federal services), and local MPs Mikhail Chesalin (the leader of the 
local structure of the Patriots of Russia party, and a former shipyard work-
er) and Solomon Ginzburg (an independent MP, famous for his appeals to 
broaden the autonomy of Kaliningrad oblast). The January protest was also 
attended by the regional structures of the federal political parties (for ex-
ample the Communists and Zhirinovsky’s LDPR), numerous businessmen 
and large numbers of residents.
The protests united the citizens and different interest groups. The ordi-
nary residents were protesting against the deteriorating economic situa-
tion and the terrible condition of social institutions. A significant part of 
the political elite was opposed to Moscow’s tightening control of the region, 
the governor’s attempts to favour United Russia and persecute other po-
litical forces. The business elite protested against unfavourable economic 
regulations and the domination of Moscow-based business which the gov-
ernor had been promoting. The ‘dissatisfied’ residents of Kaliningrad were 
supported by the leaders of political opposition from Moscow (including 
Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Milov and Ilya Yashin), who in turn wanted to 
demonstrate that the elite focused around Putin and the heads of the re-
gions whom they had nominated were losing public support.
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The federal government responded to the protests in Kaliningrad in an 
atypical way; for the first time, the Kremlin decided to replace a region’s 
leader under pressure from local elites and public. In August 2010, Boos was 
replaced by Nikolay Tsukanov, a politician born in the Kaliningrad oblast. 
Moscow also resorted to other political and financial instruments to lessen 
the dissatisfaction among the local elites and public: the unpopular region-
al ministers of healthcare and of labour & social policy were dismissed, the 
transport tax raise was postponed until next year, and a dialogue with the 
leaders of the protests was initiated. However, the protests failed to con-
vince the Kremlin to revise its regional policy; its desire to retain control 
of the region is still among its top priorities. The new governor appointed 
by the Kremlin is a politician with a weak position, strictly controlled by 
Moscow. As regards the leaders of the protests, activities were taken to in-
timidate them and discredit them in the eyes of the other participants of 
the protest action.
The Kremlin’s strategy has proved successful in the short term. The remov-
al of the controversial governor alleviated tension among the local elites 
and the public, and the discredited protest leaders lost public confidence 
and were unable to mobilise the ‘dissatisfied’ any further. Mass protests 
on this scale have not recurred in this region. The pickets held afterwards 
were attended by only dozens or hundreds of people. Even during the pro-
tests against the electoral fraud of December 2011, which gathered dozens 
of thousands people in Moscow, were attended in Kaliningrad by as few as 
several hundred to one thousand people.
1.6. the ecological situation
Ecology and environment protection are major issues in Kaliningrad oblast. 
This region has to face such problems as high levels of water and air pollution, 
the lack of environmental infrastructure, the lack of regulations which would 
force businesses to respect the natural environment, and the lack of ecological 
habits among the public. At the same time, these problems are typical of Russia 
as a whole.
One of the greatest problems in Kaliningrad oblast is the lack of sewage treat-
ment plants in most urban areas of this region, which has a strong impact on 
the entire Baltic Sea basin. Communal waste from the largest cities, including 
Kaliningrad itself, mostly goes directly into the Neman and Pregola rivers, and 
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flow with them into the Baltic Sea (see part II, chapter 2.1.2.)44. In effect, the city of 
Kaliningrad is one of the greatest sources of pollution for the Baltic Sea across 
its entire basin45. Most villages in the region have no sewage systems, so the 
waste goes into the groundwater. The existing environmental infrastructure 
is outdated (most of it was built before the war and needs to be modernised) 
and is working at the limits of its capacity. Another major problem is the lack 
of specialist facilities for the storage and disposal of industrial waste, which is 
dumped in landfill sites. Nor is there any developed system of household waste 
disposal and recycling.
Furthermore, the remnants of the military infrastructure built in the Soviet 
period are also having a detrimental impact on the region’s ecology. Post-mil-
itary areas, which need to be disarmed and recultivated (for example, some 
areas by the seaside which could potentially be attractive to tourists are still 
minefields), and the waste left by the army (scrap and remnants of military 
buildings), most of which has not been disposed of, also pose big problems.
The oblast’s government has been making efforts to lessen the pollution of the 
region’s natural environment. For example, the amount of waste water and the 
level of emissions have been reduced over the past few years46. Thanks to aid 
from the EU, a sewage treatment plant was built in Gusev, and a few others 
have been modernised (see part II, chapter 2.1.2.). Kaliningrad oblast is rated 
29th among the 83 Russian federal subjects in the ranking developed by Rus-
sian ecologists47, which is a relatively good position. Kaliningrad’s efforts to 
reduce the amount of waste entering the Baltic Sea were supported by the fed-
eral programme for developing Kaliningrad oblast until 2015, which envisages 
44 Construction work aimed at building an urban sewage treatment plant in Kaliningrad has 
been ongoing since 1997. However, despite receiving international funding for this project, 
the work has still not been completed due to the indolence of the public administration and 
the lack of co-financing from Russia. 
45 Report from the human rights ombudsman in Kaliningrad oblast ‘O soblyudienii prav i svo-
bod cheloveka i grazhdanina v kaliningradskoi oblasti za 2010 god’, op. cit.
46 The amount of waste water was reduced from 138 million m3 in 2005 to 80 million m3 in 
2010, and the level of emissions was reduced from 300,000 tonnes to 119,000 tonnes. Source: 
Report on the results and general policies of the government of Kaliningrad oblast in 2010 
(DROND 2010), prepared by the Ministry of Economy of Kaliningrad oblast, op. cit. 
47 The lower the region’s number in the ranking, the better the evaluation of its ecological 
situation. The ranking system has been developed by the Green Patrol organisation, which 
monitors the ecological situation in the region, taking into account the protection of na-
ture, the socio-ecological and the industrial-ecological situation. This organisation ranked 
Kaliningrad oblast 28th among the 83 Russian federal subjects in 2009, 35th in 2010, 38th in 
spring 2011, and 29th in summer 2011; http://www.greenpatrol.ru. 
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the implementation of pro-environmental projects. Russia has also signed up 
to the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Baltic Sea Area since 1992, which imposes on it the obligation to reduce the 
amount of waste water it produces.
2. An AreA under speciAL surVeiLLAnce: Moscow’s policy 
towards the region 
2.1. the policy of compensating for Kaliningrad’s location  
as an exclave 
Over the past twenty years, Moscow has been taking action to compensate to 
this region for the barriers caused by its situation as an exclave. These actions 
include granting the region the status of a Special Economic Zone (SEZ), sub-
sidising transit costs and developing infrastructural projects. However, Mos-
cow’s policy towards the exclave has so far been unstable and inconsist-
ent, and as such has insufficiently reduced the existing barriers which 
prevent this region’s development.
2.1.1. the special economic Zone in the exclave
Kaliningrad oblast has enjoyed customs benefits since the collapse of the 
USSR, although it was only at the beginning of 1996 that these were written 
down in the act on the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kaliningrad oblast. 
The SEZ of 1996 introduced exemptions from customs and indirect taxes 
(VAT and excise duty) for all goods imported to this region. This softened the 
economic shock caused by the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the 
new state borders in the region. The existence of the zone made it possible 
to reduce the prices of consumer goods in this region, and also enabled busi-
ness circles to use this area as a vast ‘duty-free area’, which formed a corridor 
for importing goods from other countries to the rest of Russia. Goods which 
had been brought on a duty-free basis to the region could be transported to 
other Russian territories with the benefits still applying, on condition that 
the added value following processing in the exclave was not less than 30% of 
the goods’ initial value (15% in the case of electronic equipment and house-
hold appliances). Assembly plants were created in the region which assem-
bled products from imported components; these were then sold across the 
Russian Federation. The existence of the zone, given the widespread corrup-
tion in Russia (allowing for the evasion of indirect taxes and duties) has been 
a source of numerous abuses, which have proved very expensive for the Rus-
sian budget.
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A new SEZ act, which came into force on 2006, was aimed at liquidating the 
abuses existing so far, reducing the federal budget expenses, and changing Ka-
liningrad’s economic profile based on assembly and reloading into one focused 
on production and exports. This act, which is to remain in force until 31 March 
2031, granted new tax preferences and at the same time maintained the privi-
leges of the ‘old’ zone vested in the entities registered therein for the next ten 
years. The new act ensured exemptions from income and property taxes to the 
business entities registered in the Special Economic Zone (i.e. its residents)48. 
However, firms could only benefit from these privileges on condition that they 
invested at list 150 million roubles (around US$5 million) within the first three 
years of starting up their business there. Their business could not be done in 
the oil & gas and the financial sectors, nor could it cover the production of ex-
cise goods (with the exception of cars) or wholesale and retail trade.
The benefits the new act has offered to this region are dubious. the region’s 
economic profile has not become production– and export-oriented by 2012, 
which was the main goal of the seZ. The implementation of the new law has 
primarily meant that the regional budget has been burdened with costs related 
to financing the SEZ. The customs exemptions (under the SEZ of 1996) were 
a burden for the federal budget, while the new tax privileges are to a great ex-
tent financed from the regional budget49. The new SEZ, which offers privileges 
only to large investors, has attracted only a few dozen of residents (around 50 
at the beginning of 2012), and their investments have so far amounted to only 
around US$120 million (the residents have declared they would invest 32 bil-
lion roubles, i.e. US$1 billion, in total50). In the investors’ opinion, the new SEZ’s 
rules of operation are rather unattractive. Their reservations include the lack 
of a possibility to include the lease charges in the investment value, and the 
short period of tax exemptions51. All the residents registered in the ‘new’ SEZ 
48 Residents are exempted from the corporate income tax and the property tax for the first six 
years of their operation in the SEZ, and will pay only 50% of these taxes for six years after that. 
49 According to the Fiscal Code of the Russian Federation, revenues from customs duty go to 
the federal budget, while the property tax goes to regional budgets, as does the greater part 
of the corporate income tax (the rate of this tax in Russia is currently 20%, of which 18 per-
centage points go to the regional budgets). 
50 Twice as much was invested in this region as a total in 2010. One of the largest investments 
was the construction of a plant for the cultivation and processing of soya beans, whose de-
clared investments exceeded US$200 million. 
51 For example, lease charges cannot be included in the investment. Furthermore, the period 
of tax exemptions is too short in the case of some projects. For more, see http://www.tks.ru/
reviews/2011/03/05/02
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will compensate for these disadvantages until 2016 by using the privileges of-
fered by the ‘old’ zone of 1996.
The most painful consequence of the change in the SEZ rules has been the re-
duction of support for the entities which until then were the most rapidly de-
veloping in the region: the small– and medium-sized firms (including foreign 
ones) and the services sector (the new SEZ act disregards these sectors). As 
a consequence, the number of companies in this region with foreign capital 
share has fallen by almost four times 52.
The problems for the economic entities operating within the exclave have been 
further exacerbated by Moscow’s disregard of the region’s privileges during its 
preparation of federally-binding legal acts. For example, the documents of 2010 
which established a customs union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus 
did not take the Kaliningrad region’s customs benefits into consideration. Lo-
cal political and business elites were forced to intervene in Moscow to ensure 
that an appropriate regulation was included and that their privileges were 
maintained. Similarly, the reform of the Russian fiscal system of 2001 failed to 
consider the special conditions existing in this region, as a result of which VAT 
and excise duty were imposed on goods from Kaliningrad for two months; in 
turn, the exclave withheld exports from this region to the rest of Russia. It was 
only then that Moscow changed its decision.
Since spring 2011, Kaliningrad and Moscow have been involved in intensive 
discussions about the need to develop new rules for the zone which could begin 
to apply in 2017–2031, i.e. when the transition regulations on the operation of 
the SEZ of 1996 are no longer in force.
2.1.2. compensating for the costs resulting from the region’s peripheral 
location
Subsidies and subventions from the federal budget are an important element of 
Moscow’s economic policy towards this region. However, the benefits offered by 
the federal government are unable to compensate fully for the costs incurred by 
the region and its residents. One example of this is the price of gas, the key raw 
52 Over 2000 companies with a foreign capital share were registered in this region in 2005, 
including over 600 with Lithuanian capital and 500 with Polish capital (some of them were 
sham firms, which did not operate in reality, and were only established to enable goods to 
be imported into this region on a duty-free basis). In 2010, the estimated number of compa-
nies with foreign capital share was around 500, including 194 with Lithuanian capital and 106 
with Polish capital. Source: Rosstat 2010, and data from the Polish and Lithuanian consulates.
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material for producing electrical energy in this region. Although regional gas 
recipients are exempted from charges for gas transit via Belarus and Lithuania, 
the gas prices in this region are higher than average Russian prices.
The benefits which the state introduced for transport between Kaliningrad and 
the rest of Russia do not guarantee that such contacts will be intensified. Al-
though air tickets from Kaliningrad to Moscow and Saint Petersburg for chil-
dren, young people and elderly people are subsidised from the state budget53, 
their prices are still high (sometimes higher than the costs of flights to Western 
Europe), and their number is limited. As regards goods transport, the direct 
railway and ferry connection between Baltiysk–Ust–Luga54 (Leningrad oblast) 
and the rest of Russia promoted by the federal government, their frequency is 
too low and they take too much time.
Moscow has exempted residents of Kaliningrad from charges for foreign pass-
ports, which are necessary to travel to the other regions of Russia by rail (the 
cheapest means of transport) through Lithuania, which in turn is very helpful 
for them. This makes it easier for residents of Kaliningrad to travel abroad also.
2.1.3. Federal infrastructural projects in the region 
According to Moscow’s declarations, large infrastructural projects funded 
from the central budget are to be an important instrument in supporting 
the development of Kaliningrad oblast. The key projects implemented in the 
exclave over the past decade include the construction of the TEC-2 heating and 
power plant, and the modernisation and development of the road infrastruc-
ture. Khrabrovo airport has been modernised and developed thanks to funds 
from the central budget55. The construction of a highway to connect Kalinin-
grad and the holiday resorts by the seaside and the airport is underway (the 
Kaliningrad–Zelenogradsk–Khrabrovo section is already open to traffic). The 
federal government has also fostered more intensive use of the exclave’s ports 
53 Pursuant to the Russian government’s ordinance of 18 December 2010, a discount ticket 
running Kaliningrad–Moscow–Kaliningrad cost 7200 rubles (around US$240), and Kalin-
ingrad–Saint Petersburg–Kaliningrad 6600 roubles (around US$220). The number of seats 
at discount prices is limited. The discount air ticket is more than twice as expensive as 
a railway ticket. Similar support is also offered to Russian citizens living in the Far East. 
54 Russian Railways introduced preferential transport rates on the Kaliningrad–Ust-Luga 
route. In 2011, ferries went twice a week, and travel from port to port lasted 36 hours, while 
a land trip to Saint Petersburg via Lithuania and Belarus takes around 25 hours. 
55 In 2008, this region had direct connections with thirteen airports in Russia and twenty in the 
CIS & Europe. However, the number of direct connections has fallen since the local carrier, KD-
Avia, went bankrupt in 2009. The region had only seven direct connections in winter 2011/2012. 
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(Russia’s only ice-free ports on the Baltic Sea) so that they can compete with the 
ports of the Baltic states (mainly Klaipeda). To this end, the approach track to 
the Baltiysk port was modernised, and a ferry and railway complex was built 
in this port. Baltiysk is primarily a military port, with two basins open for ci-
vilian vessels. Attempts to establish regular ferry connections between the ex-
clave and German ports have been made for several years56.
Additionally, preparations for the construction of a nuclear power plant in this 
region have begun. The city of Kaliningrad was also put by Moscow on the list 
of potential hosts of the Football World Cup, to be held in Russia in 2018.
It has been possible to allocate funds for these projects, which account for a ma-
jor part of the investments of basic capital in this region57, thanks to the good 
condition of public finances in the Russian Federation. Kaliningrad oblast has 
benefited from the increase in investment expenditure observed throughout 
Russia in the past decade (see chart 8).
The implementation of federal projects has brought numerous benefits to the 
exclave. It is contributing to the development of the region itself and the mod-
ernisation of its infrastructure (this especially concerns the networks of roads, 
railways and the port embankment) and the improvement of the exclave’s en-
ergy security (new sources of electrical energy), creates jobs for local people 
and regional subcontractors58, and ensures demand for local construction ma-
terials. Therefore, these projects have been welcomed by the regional elites in 
most cases. However, a source of dissatisfaction is the strengthening of federal 
capital’s position in the exclave and the marginalisation of local business en-
tities. The large infrastructural projects in the region are predominantly be-
ing implemented by federal corporations (Gazprom, LUKoil, Rosatom and con-
struction firms). Furthermore, decisions on the investments and their details 
56 A ferry connection between Kaliningrad and the German ports of Sassnitz and Kiel was 
also to be reintroduced in 2011. This was expected to be an extension of the route from Ust-
Luga to Baltiysk. Several trips were made in that direction in 2007/2008, but the connec-
tions have been suspended due to their low profitability. At present, the Klaipeda port offers 
cheaper connections to Sassnitz.
57 For example, the construction of the second block of the TEC-2 heating and power plant 
alone cost 22.5 billion roubles (over US$700 million), and the construction of the first sec-
tion of the highway from Kaliningrad to the holiday resorts by the seaside (27 km) has cost 
6.7 billion roubles (almost US$250,000). The estimated cost of constructing a nuclear power 
plant in the region is €6.5 billion.
58 According to data for May 2011, thirty local firms are engaged in preparations for the pro-
jects, and over five hundred residents of this region are employed in connection with it. 
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are taken in Moscow, without considering the opinion of the regional elite’s 
and the expectations of the exclave. One example of this is the TEC-2 heating 
and power plant, which is of key significance for the region’s energy security. 
The implementation of this project, which was initially financed by Gazprom 
alone, was dragging on for years because this gas monopoly was not interested 
in subsidising gas supplies to this region. The consequent power shortage was 
one of the major impediments to the region’s development59.
The decision to build the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant in Kaliningrad oblast (see box 5) 
was also received unfavourably by the region’s elite and public60. The exclave’s 
elites had reservations in connection with this project because the decision 
had been taken suddenly (it was fostered by the then governor Boos), and they 
had been totally ignored during the decision-making process. The local public, 
fearing the project’s adverse ecological impact, are also ill-disposed towards it.
chart 8. investments in basic capital in Kaliningrad oblast 
Source: Rosstat 2012
59 The completion of the heating and power plant was possible owing to the engagement of 
Inter RAO, a subsidiary of Rosatom (which is planning to build the nuclear power plant in 
the exclave), as well as regularly raising the internal gas prices. 
60 According to public opinion polls carried out in May 2009 by the Kaliningrad Monitoring 
Group, 43% of the respondents opposed building the nuclear power plant in the region, 19% 
favoured the implementation of this project, and 26% would not mind it, if the project was 
carried out in compliance with all ecological and technical standards. A social movement 
opposing this project emerged in this region; its members have demanded that a referen-
dum should be held on this issue.
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Box 5. characteristics of the Baltic nuclear power plant 
According to the government’s guidelines, two VVER-type reactors with 
a total output of 2400 MW are to operate in the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant. 
The first reactor is expected to be built by 2017, and the second between 
2012 and 2019. The state (Rosatom) will still be the majority shareholder 
(51%) of this project, and the remaining stakes will be sold to private inves-
tors, including foreigners. Most of the energy to be produced by the plant 
will be exported, because Kaliningrad oblast’s demand for energy is met 
by other regional power plants. According to Rosatom’s estimates, the con-
struction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant will cost over US$6.5 billion (200 
billion roubles). In 2010, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed a decree un-
der which US$400 million would be allocated within the next two years 
for building the power plant in Kaliningrad oblast. Furthermore, Rosatom 
has been trying to interest private investors in this project; for example, it 
has come up with offers directed to Polish and Lithuanian business circles. 
Russia is pinning special hope on the possibility of German investors join-
ing the project, especially in the context of the decision to decommission 
German nuclear power plants by 2022, and the need to meet the demand 
for energy from other sources. However, no private investor has become 
a shareholder of the plant thus far (February 2012). Nor has Rosatom found 
potential recipients of the power to be produced by the plant, or secured 
the routes for its supply. Rosatom is considering three potential routes for 
energy export to the European market: (1) through Lithuania and on to 
the other Baltic states (and possibly to Poland after the Polish-Lithuanian 
energy bridge has been created; this is planned to be completed by 2015); 
(2) building a direct connection with Poland, (3) laying a cable along the 
Baltic Sea bed in the direction of Germany. Despite these uncertainties, 
preparatory work connected to the implementation of this project has al-
ready begun, thanks to strong political support from the Kremlin.
The genesis of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant 
The idea of building a nuclear power plant in Kaliningrad oblast has been 
promoted since spring 2008, although this project had not been mentioned 
in the previous plans for developing the nuclear sector: the plant was not 
taken into account either in the ‘General Scheme of the Location of Power 
Facilities in Russia until 2020’ approved by the Russian government in 2008 
or in the ‘Action Programme of the Nuclear Power Corporation Rosatom for 
2009–2015’.
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April 2008 – Rosatom signed a co-operation agreement concerning the 
power plant’s construction with the government of Kaliningrad oblast.
August 2008 – Rosatom issued an order, according to which the power 
plant’s design was to be completed before 2010. The state-owned corpo-
ration Energoatom was entrusted with managing the project (it controls 
all the ten nuclear power plants in the Russian Federation). Atomenergo-
proekt, a design and construction institute from Saint Petersburg, was put 
in charge of preparing the construction plans for the power plant (it has 
designed eighteen units of this type in operation so far).
August 2009 – Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the con-
struction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant in Kaliningrad oblast.
February 2010 – the cornerstone was laid at the plant construction site 
near the town of Neman in Kaliningrad oblast. Prime Minister Putin 
signed a decree allocating around US$400 million to implement this project 
within two years.
november 2010 – a tender for the construction of casings for the power 
plant’s reactors was held. It was won by a factory from Petrozavodsk (Ka-
relia) owned by a subsidiary of Rosatom, ZAO Inzhenernaya Kompaniya 
AEM-Tekhnologii (which has no experience in this field).
10 november 2011 – Inter RAO, the Russian investor in the Baltic Nuclear 
Power Plant, signed a memorandum with the Swiss energy company Alpiq 
on examining the possibilities for co-operation on laying an underwater ca-
ble for power transmission (800 MW) to connect the Kaliningrad oblast with 
Germany. Additionally, the companies signed an agreement under which the 
technical and economic possibilities for co-operation on exporting electric-
ity to Poland were to be analysed by 1 April 2012. For this purpose, an energy 
connection (direct current at 400kV) between Kaliningrad oblast and Poland 
would be created. Alpiq, which has operated in Poland since 2001, could pur-
chase up to 600 MW of energy from Inter RAO for the Polish market.
By early 2011 consultations concerning the plant’s impact on the natural 
environment in Poland, Germany, Latvia and Estonia had been held; prepa-
rations for implementing the project were made at the construction site: 
melioration, devising and constructing a road, railways, infrastructure for 
the electrical system, etc.
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2.1.4. developing tourism in the region
The local government has recognised tourism as one of the priority areas in 
the context of developing the exclave’s economy. Actions taken to help develop 
the tourist infrastructure have included the creation of a special tourist zone 
and a special recreation and gambling zone (see Map). However, Moscow has 
failed to consider the key barriers to the development of this sector in the Ka-
liningrad oblast: limited attractiveness to tourists (for example in compari-
son to the Black Sea or the Polish and Lithuanian seaside), the low quality of 
the services considering their prices, and the impeded access to this region to 
both residents of other parts of Russia (distance) and tourists from the EU (visa 
issues)61. In turn, the visa facilitations introduced for tourists are subject to so 
many conditions that they have had no positive effect in the case of Kalinin-
grad oblast. For example, the possibility of a visa-free stay for 72 hours was of-
fered in 2009 to tourists who came to the exclave by passenger ships. However, 
this can only be used on condition that lists of passenger names and a planned 
itinerary are sent to the port several days ahead, and in such a case tourists can 
only see the cities in groups, with a guide, and along previously agreed routes.
In 2007, the Russian government adopted a decree establishing a special tour-
ist zone on the Curonian Spit. However, plans to attract investors to the zone 
ended in failure. Not a single investor has appeared in the zone for five years 
since the document was signed. The implementation of potential investments 
has been prevented by the fact that the ownership structure of the land on 
the Curonian Spit is unclear. Furthermore, this area is a national park on the 
UNESCO World Heritage list, which has reduced the possibilities of develop-
ing any infrastructure there. Another impediment is the fact that this area 
has not been completely cleared of mines since World War II, and remnants of 
military facilities can still be found on much of the area. As a result, the Rus-
sian Ministry of Economic Development brought a motion to close the zone in 
August 2011.
The concept the government devised in 2006 to create a recreation and gam-
bling area next to the town of Yantarny has still not been realised. Investors 
have not been interested in spending money on building the infrastructure 
because the profitability of such an investment was dubious, due to the great 
61 These barriers have prevented the expectations the region had in the 1990s – that the tourist 
sector would develop owing to former residents’ ‘sentimental’ visits – from being realised. 
German tourists usually come to this region in organised groups, and use local services to 
only a limited extent; they usually do not return after the first visit. 
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distance between this region and the prospective clients. Furthermore, con-
trary to appeals from the regional government62, Moscow chose a site for this 
investment which made it even less attractive (partly due to the need to buy 
land from private owners). The regional government dislikes this project be-
cause it fears it could have a negative social impact (increasing crime levels, 
drug trafficking, etc.).
The development of tourism outside the special areas in this region has also 
encountered a number of problems. The most popular holiday resort so far, the 
coastal town of Yantarny, with relatively well-developed tourist facilities, is 
located within the restricted access zone, entrance to which requires a special 
pass (see section 2.3.). Apart from this, access to the beaches is limited for tour-
ists due to amber production, the richest deposits of which are located pre-
cisely in that spot. In 2010, the Russian Ministry of Finance, the owner of the 
Kaliningrad amber production plant, embarked upon amber extraction from 
a new deposit located in the immediate vicinity of the beach.
2.2. the policy of reinforcing social ties with the rest of russia
Since 2005, Moscow has intensified social programmes aimed primarily at 
strengthening the ties between the residents of Kaliningrad oblast (especially 
young people) and those of other Russian regions. The Ministry of Education 
in 2006 launched a programme called ‘We, Russians’, the purpose of which 
is to make young residents of Kaliningrad oblast feel attached to the rest of 
the Russian Federation. Educational excursions to the most interesting plac-
es in Russia are held as part of this programme. 60,000 people, around 25% 
of Kaliningrad’s youth, took part in such excursions in the first five years of 
the programme’s operation63. Furthermore, camps for young people from all 
of Russia have been organised in Kaliningrad oblast since 2010. The partici-
pants (around 2000 people annually) attend classes on patriotism, in the broad 
meaning of the term.
62 The regional government has been making appeals for this to be moved near Svetlogorsk 
(a resort by the Baltic Sea), where the possible costs of the project would be much lower 
owing to the proximity of an airport, possibilities of developing the existing port, and the 
well-developed road, power supply and other infrastructure. 
63 The estimated number of young people in this region is 248,000 (data from www.molod39.
ru as of 1 January 2010).
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strengthening the position of the orthodox church is a significant ele-
ment of the strategy of building ties between the region and the rest of 
russia. The Orthodox Church has been present in this region for a very short 
time. Churches owned by the Protestant (the predominant religious belief 
in the region pre-war) and Catholic faiths were closed after 1946. It was only 
in 1985 that the first Orthodox church was opened in this region, in a build-
ing formerly used by an Evangelical congregation in a district of Kaliningrad. 
Since the collapse of the USSR, the reinforcement of the Orthodox faith in this 
region has been treated as a bonding element between the exclave and the rest 
of Russia64. One effect of this policy is a significant increase in the number of 
Orthodox parishes in this region (up to around 80 in 2010). Furthermore, this 
process has continued recently thanks to decisions taken at various levels of 
Kaliningrad’s administration, which decided in 2010 to offer tens of historical 
buildings, mainly former Evangelical and Catholic churches, to the Orthodox 
Church65. This decision was passed shortly before a federal law on the restitu-
tion of property to religious organisations came into force, under which reli-
gious properties were to be returned to their previous use66. These decisions 
raised great controversies among the public, since public institutions operate 
in many of the premises subject to restitution. For example, Kaliningrad’s in-
telligentsia has protested against the transfer of ownership to the Orthodox 
Church, claiming that this upsets the cultural heritage of the region. Further-
more, the change of ownership of some former places of worship has delayed 
64 The construction of the monumental Church of Christ the Saviour on one of the main 
squares of Kaliningrad has become a symbol of this policy, which the Orthodox hierarchs 
themselves referred to as ‘linking Kaliningrad oblast to Russia’. For more details, see ‘Pra-
voslaviye na Kaliningradskoy Zemle’, website of the Patriarchate of Moscow www.patriar-
chia.ru/db/print/592484.html. 
65 The election of Kirill I as the Patriarch of All Russia, who had been successfully lobbying for 
the interests of the Orthodox Church in the regions, had a great impact on these decisions. 
66 This law was passed on 19 November 2010. The transfer of ownership to the Orthodox 
Church also gave rise to two supra-regional conflicts. The list of the properties included 
a former Protestant church which is now a museum to Kristijonas Donelaitis, a Lithuanian 
pastor and poet. Following a protest from the Lithuanian president, Dalia Grybauskaite, 
this monument was removed from the list. In turn, the Catholic Church has been apply-
ing for years for the restitution of a historic church in Kaliningrad, which is now used as 
a concert hall. However, this decision has not been changed, despite a protest from the head 
of the Russian episcopate. The Orthodox Church also wanted to take over a building which 
was once the Protestant cathedral in Kaliningrad, and now is a museum to Kant. It was not 
put on the list because of a personal intervention from Chancellor Angela Merkel to Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin. For more on this issue, see V. Ryzhkov, ‘Udar po kulture Kalin-
ingrada’, http://www.scepsis.ru/library/id_2847.html and A. Karpenko, ‘Istoriya o “tserko-
vnoy privatizatsii”: sobytiya 2010 goda v Kaliningradskoy oblasti, http://www.scepsis.ru/
library/id_2995.html 
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renovation work, which was financed either as part of European projects or 
from money donated by associations of the region’s former Prussian residents67.
2.3. the policy of restricted access for foreign partners  
to the region
2.3.1. restricted access zones
Kaliningrad oblast is a region over a large part of whose territory restric-
tions on access for foreigners apply. Citizens of other countries may not enter 
the five-kilometre-wide strip along the state border68, which – given the small 
area of this region – is a serious impediment. Furthermore, other restricted 
access zones apply in Kaliningrad oblast, which in total extend over around 
one-third of the region’s territory, including the entire Russian section of 
the Vistula Spit and a large part of the coastline69 (see Map). Foreigners may 
move across these zones using special passes (it takes from ten to as much as 
sixty days to obtain one). An additional difficulty is posed by the fact that the 
borders of these zones are not marked; maps of these zones are not commonly 
available, although they were supposed to have been made available for con-
sular agencies and investors. There have been many cases when people have 
unknowingly crossed the borders of these zones without holding the required 
documents, and were apprehended and punished70. one of the largest invest-
ments made in this region over the past few years, the highway which 
connects the city of Kaliningrad to the airport and the seaside, also runs 
through a restricted access zone. People who have come to Kaliningrad by 
air formally have no right to go to the city via the highway built for this pur-
pose. the local border traffic regime with poland, which was introduced in 
July 2012 and which formally covers the entire territory of Kaliningrad 
oblast, will have no impact on the restrictions concerning the foreigners’ 
access to these zones.
67 Examples of this are the withholding for formal reasons of funding to restore the castle in 
Guryevsk (formerly Neuhausen) under the CBC Neighbourhood programme, and renova-
tion of the church in Rodniki (formerly Arnau) financed by German organisations. 
68 The list of restricted access zones in Kaliningrad oblast is provided in the ordinance of the 
Federal Security Service of 2 June 2006. Its text is available at http://www.rg.ru/2006/07/14/
kaliningrad.html 
69 The list of the restricted access zones for foreigners is provided in the ordinance of the 
Russian government of 4 July 1991. Its text is available at http://www.fstec.ru/_docs/
doc_1_4_009.htm
70 In February 2009, militia officers detained the Polish and German consuls-general, who 
were going to attend celebrations devoted to the victims of the Holocaust in Yantarny, 
which is located in a restricted access zone, and forced them to turn back.
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Another significant limitation for investors is the ban on the sale of land to 
foreigners covering 90% of the Kaliningrad oblast’s territory71; foreign citizens 
can only lease land. Furthermore, visa facilitations introduced for foreign in-
vestors (which the SEZ act includes) are not observed in practice. According 
to the regulations, investors with resident status and representatives of the 
entities which co-operate with them are allowed to receive visas immediately 
at the border. However, these regulations do not work in practice, because this 
procedure is usually undermined by federal border services.
2.3.2. Moscow’s stance on the use of the Vistula and curonian Lagoons
Russia treats the Vistula and Curonian Lagoons as its internal waters, access to 
which should be restricted for foreign vessels for security reasons. As a result 
of this policy, the development of port infrastructure is being neglected on both 
the Curonian and the Vistula Spits. Although formally Moscow has decided to 
open the Curonian 72 and the Vistula Lagoons73 for sailing, maritime traffic in 
these waters is limited in practice. In the case of the Curonian Lagoon, Lithu-
anian ships may not enter Russian waters because there is no border checkpoint 
where the ships could be cleared (although Moscow undertook to ensure this 
in the agreement). Russia opened the Vistula Lagoon to foreign maritime traf-
fic again after a break of some years (2006–2009), although this has not brought 
about any significant revival of traffic in these waters. This is due to the poorly-
developed coastline infrastructure and the fact that goods can only be cleared in 
the ports of Baltiysk or Kaliningrad. Furthermore, Russia has reserved the right 
to close the border on the lagoon for defence, security or environmental protec-
tion reasons. Another impediment to the traffic of ships under other countries’ 
flags heading for Polish ports is the requirement to notify the Russian side of the 
voyage fourteen days in advance, and for the shipowner to have a representative 
71 Pursuant to the presidential decree of 9 January 2011, only three territorial units, which 
have a total area of 2700 km2, are not covered by these regulations (the Chernyakovsk, Gu-
sev and Gvardeysk districts). For more, see http://президент.рф/acts/10033.
72 The Lithuanian-Russian agreement on traffic in the Curonian Lagoon was signed on 4 De-
cember 2007. The Russian parliament ratified it in April 2009. The agreement was signed 
for a period of five years and can be automatically extended for another year; http://www.
sng.allbusiness.ru/BPravo/DocumShow_DocumID_139845.html 
73 On 15 July 2009 the Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin signed an ordinance admitting 
traffic in the Russian part of the Vistula Lagoon for ships with third-country civil ensigns go-
ing to and from Polish ports: http://government.ru/gov/results/7562/. On 1 September 2009, 
Poland and Russia signed an agreement on ship traffic in the Vistula Lagoon. Both documents 
became effective on the date of signing the Polish-Russian agreement. The agreement was 
signed for five years and can be automatically extended for another five-year term; http://
www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/komunikaty/UMOWA_zalew_tekst%20polski.pdf
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in Russia. As a consequence, the Lagoon’s potential is not used, and the traffic in 
it is limited to barges carrying coal and construction materials.
2.4. the policy of controlling the region’s co-operation with other 
countries 
2.4.1. Moscow’s approach to Kaliningrad residents’ travel 
One of Moscow’s priorities is to control the process of opening up the Kalin-
ingrad oblast to co-operation with the European Union, and in the first order 
with its neighbouring countries, Poland and Lithuania.
Travel facilitations for residents of this exclave are among the key issues 
concerning this region’s contacts with the EU after Poland and Lithuania in-
troduced a visa regime with regard to Russia (and thus also to Kaliningrad 
oblast) in 2003, shortly before their accession to the European Union. This 
made it more difficult for residents of Kaliningrad oblast to travel both to the 
neighbouring EU member states and to the rest of Russia, since the trip by 
land involved crossing the border of a EU member state, Lithuania. Given this 
situation, Moscow focused its efforts on ensuring facilitations for people 
travelling between Kaliningrad oblast and the rest of russia. After Mos-
cow’s long and tough negotiations with Vilnius and Brussels, it was agreed that 
a Facilitated Transit Document and a Facilitated Rail Transit Document would 
be introduced on 1 July 2003. These documents have applied with regard to 
Russian citizens travelling in transit through Lithuania to or from Kalinin-
grad, and offer significant facilitations in comparison to the visa regime74.
However making it easier for residents of Kaliningrad oblast to travel to 
the european union has not been Moscow’s priority. The government of this 
region (including Governor Nikolay Tsukanov75) has issued numerous appeals 
to make Kaliningrad a ‘pilot’ region in the process of establishing a visa-free re-
74 Russian citizens who wish to go through Lithuania to or from Kaliningrad must apply for 
an Facilitated Transit Document/ Facilitated Rail Transit Document to the Lithuanian con-
sular service. In the case of rail transit, the traveller should submit an application in the 
railway ticket office 24 hours at the latest before the planned trip. The document itself is 
issued at the time of Lithuanian passport control on the Lithuanian-Russian border. The 
Facilitated Rail Transit Document is issued free of charge.
75 Tsukanov has made such appeals both in contacts with representatives of Poland; for ex-
ample, to Wojciech Zajączkowski, the Polish ambassador to Russia (see: http://kaliningrad-
first.ru/?p=88969), during the meeting of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Co-operation Com-
mittee in Warsaw on 21 September 2011, and in numerous statements made for the local and 
national media (see: http://www.governors.ru/?statja=191161). 
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gime between the European Union and the entire Russian Federation. However, 
this proposal has not been backed by the government in Moscow, and the issue 
has not been raised in talks with Brussels. Instead, Moscow has intensified ef-
forts for the local border traffic rules, which envisage visa-free movement in the 
frontier area along the external borders of the Schengen zone, to apply to Ka-
liningrad oblast76. At the same time, Moscow changed its tactics; while it had 
previously been negotiating an agreement to this effect with Lithuania in line 
with the applicable Schengen zone regulations (visa-free movement in a 30 kilo-
metre-wide frontier belt), the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2010 came 
up with the proposal for the local border traffic rule to be extended to the 
entire region, which goes significantly beyond EU regulations (the total area is 
205 km long and 108 km wide). Moscow’s proposal was backed by Warsaw, and 
the two countries brought this initiative to the EU forum. Lithuania did not join 
this initiative because it had had a negative experience negotiating the local bor-
der traffic agreement with Russia (in 2009, when the negotiations were over, the 
Russian government chose not to sign the already arranged agreement). At the 
same time, Lithuania raised objections against the proposal to extend the local 
border traffic rule to a comparable area on the Lithuanian side, as this would 
cover a large part of the latter country’s territory.
The Polish-Russian proposal in 2011 was accepted by Brussels, and the foreign 
ministers of Poland and Russia signed a bilateral local border traffic agree-
ment on 14 December 2011 (see box 6). The parliaments of the two states have 
endorsed the ratification of the agreement (the Polish Sejm voted it in March 
2012, and the Russian State Duma in May 2012). The agreement came into force 
in  July 201277. At the same time, doubts have been raised in the region as to 
whether the capacity of the existing border infrastructure will be sufficient 
to ensure smooth local border traffic78. Such concerns (especially about the 
border crossing points being jammed by individuals engaged in small frontier 
trade) have been expressed in particular by representatives of business circles, 
who hold multiple-entry Schengen visas.
76 According to Schengen regulations, visa-free movement applies within a 30 km-wide bor-
der region (in exceptional cases this is extended to 50 km). Residents of frontier regions 
cross the border on the basis of special permits issued by consulates. See, for example, 
http://www.migrant.info.pl/pl/pobyt/wjazd_do_polski
77 The Polish parliament endorsed the ratification of the agreement on March 16, 2012 (presi-
dent Komorowski signed it on May 4, 2012). The Russian State Duma endorsed the ratifica-
tion on May 25, 2012 (president Putin signed it on June 16, 2012). 
78 Such fears have been expressed by members of the regional parliament, among others; see 
for example: http://www.kaliningrad.net/news/49259/.
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Box 6. Local border traffic between Kaliningrad oblast and poland 
Under the agreement, residents of Kaliningrad oblast who have lived there 
for at least three years are entitled to benefit from a local border traffic re-
gime. The pass to cross the border is issued by the Polish consulate for a pe-
riod of between two and five years, and costs €20 (free of charge to people 
under 16 and over 65). The individuals who use the local border traffic are 
allowed to stay in Poland uninterruptedly for thirty days (but no longer 
than ninety days within every six months). This permission does not au-
thorise the holder to work or run a business in the Republic of Poland.
The local border traffic agreement extends to the entire Kaliningrad oblast, 
and on the Polish side to the cities of Sopot, Gdańsk, Gdynia, Elbląg and 
Olsztyn and the counties (powiaty) of Puck, Gdańsk, Nowy Dwór Gdański, 
Malbork, Elbląg, Braniewo, Lidzbark, Bartoszyce, Olsztyn, Kętrzyn, 
Mrągowo, Węgorzewo, Giżycko, Gołdap and Olecko.
Although the local border traffic regime in relations with Poland has been im-
plemented, Moscow’s stance on this issue seems to be ambivalent. For Moscow, 
visa facilitations for residents of the Kaliningrad oblast appear to be a nego-
tiating tactic in its talks with Brussels, rather than a goal in itself. This issue 
has not been a priority for Moscow, which can be proved by the fact that im-
plementing local border traffic regime has been delayed for several years (the 
facilitations offered under the Schengen regulations, for example with Lithu-
ania, have not been used earlier). Further confirmation that this is the right 
assumption could be the lack of any official reaction from Moscow to the EU’s 
consent for the local border traffic regime to be extended to the entire Kalinin-
grad oblast, which was given in response to requests from Russia itself, and 
should thus be seen by Russia as a success for its negotiations79.
The fact that Vladimir Putin criticised the idea of introducing the local bor-
der traffic regime in the Kaliningrad oblast immediately before the Russia-EU 
summit in June 2011 may indicate that Moscow has been merely capitalising on 
this issue. Putin then stated that it was unacceptable to offer “visa privileges 
79 Politicians in Moscow did not comment on the European Commission’s decision. President 
Dmitri Medvedev visited Kaliningrad oblast two days after the decision had been made 
public (1 August 2011), yet the issue of the EU having accepted the Russian proposal was not 
raised officially. 
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to one region at the expense of the others”80. This statement may be seen as 
a form of pressure on the EU in the ongoing negotiations on lifting the visa 
requirement for all citizens of Russia. Moreover, making proposals which go 
significantly beyond the applicable regulations at the EU forum (such as that 
of extending the local border traffic regime to the entire Kaliningrad oblast) 
can be seen as Moscow’s negotiating tactic aimed at establishing the extent to 
which Brussels is ready to make concessions. Moscow may use its experience 
with successfully modifying EU regulations in other areas, including its ef-
forts to change provisions which are unfavourable to Russia (such as the so-
called Third Energy Package).
2.4.2. Moscow’s influence on the region’s cross-border co-operation 
Another manifestation of Moscow’s control of the region’s co-operation with its 
neighbours from the EU was the stance it took on the EU-funded programmes 
covering cross-border co-operation with Russian regions located in the EU’s 
neighbourhood, including the Kaliningrad oblast. As a consequence of its ac-
tions – or inaction –, russia has limited the possibilities for entities from 
the Kaliningrad oblast to benefit from financial support offered by the 
european union.
Kaliningrad oblast could have benefited from two programmes envisaged in 
the EU financial framework for 2007–2013. Brussels allocated €132 million 
for the land-based Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) Lithuania–Poland–Russia 
(LT-PL-RU) programme81, and €217 million for the maritime Baltic Sea Region 
programme. However, due to Moscow’s failure to sign a Financial Agreement 
with the EU, Russian entities have been unable to receive the funds offered 
as part of the Baltic Sea Region Programme. In turn, in the case of the land-
based CBC programme, Moscow’s actions have caused serious delays in im-
plementing the project.
The EU’s Baltic Sea Region Programme was aimed at intensifying co-operation 
between eleven countries82 in the Baltic Sea basin, covering the management of 
80 At that time Putin made references to the LBT rules (although he referred to them as visa-
free movement). See for example http://kaliningrad.ru/news/item/12142-putin-rossiya-
ne-budet-dobivatsya-vizovyh-privilegij-dlya-kaliningradskoj-oblasti
81 CBC is an instrument of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy. For more on the Lithua-
nia-Poland-Russia programme see: http://www.lt-pl-ru.eu
82 Eight EU member states: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland 
and Sweden; together with Norway (which co-operates closely with the EU), Belarus and 
Russia. See http://eu.baltic.net/
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marine resources, transport development and improving security. The funds 
allocated by Brussels for 2007–2013 as part of the Baltic Sea Region Programme 
were to help implement such tasks as the continuation of previous actions in 
this region supported by the EU, from which entities in north-eastern Russia 
(including to a large extent from Kaliningrad oblast) also benefited. However, 
starting from 2009, they were no longer able to benefit from EU support and 
were excluded from these projects, due to Russia’s failure to sign the Financial 
Agreement before the deadline set by the EU (31 December 2008).
The main tasks of the land-based CBC project (for 2007–2013) include the devel-
opment of frontier regions, intensifying their co-operation, and fostering con-
tacts between people. Earlier, these projects were financed as part of the EU’s 
TACIS programme. Since Poland and Lithuania joined the European Union, 
funds have also been provided as part of a new support programme covering 
these two countries and Kaliningrad oblast83. The process of preparing a new 
agenda for Kaliningrad began in 2006, when the EU took a decision to continue 
its support for Kaliningrad oblast as part of the Lithuania–Poland–Russia pro-
gramme. The EU set the goals and priorities of this programme in consultation 
with the region’s government, with whom the exclave’s problems and needs 
were discussed. Moscow was merely an observer in this process. The Kremlin 
decided to become directly involved in this programme at the final stage of the 
preparations for the project in late 2008, when work on the Financial Agree-
ment was in progress. It offered financial support of €44 million,84 and started 
demanding that it should have the same rights in the decision-making process 
as the EU, including control of the money spent. As a result of the negotiations, 
Moscow was given the opportunity to co-participate (upon invitation from the 
EU) in project audits held by EU bodies, albeit on condition that the country 
where the audit was conducted accepted the Russian presence. The negotia-
tions concerning this issue were concluded as late as autumn 2009. The imple-
mentation of the programme still could not commence because Russia deemed 
83 TACIS was aimed at supporting democratic and pro-market reforms in the CIS region. Its 
funds were allocated for the modernisation and development of cross-border infrastruc-
ture, co-operation between the communities and technical assistance. In 2004-6, Poland 
and Lithuania allocated €12.3 million each to the Poland–Lithuania–Russian Federation 
(Kaliningrad oblast) Neighbourhood Programme from the funds offered by the European 
Regional Development Fund, and €8 million more was granted as part of TACIS. This co-
operation brought about 162 projects. 
84 The Kremlin offered financial support to all the EU’s CBC programmes which concerned Rus-
sian regions. In addition to Kaliningrad oblast, there are four other programmes concerning 
co-operation between Russian frontier regions with Latvia, Estonia, Finland and Norway.
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that it had to ratify the Financial Agreement (which was a new solution, not 
previously employed in CBC projects). This happened as late as July 2010. The 
approach Russia has taken has significantly contributed to delaying this pro-
ject. The first applications started to be received as part of LT-PR-RF as late as 
June 2011, and it has not been possible to begin implementing them by Febru-
ary 201285, five years since the commencement of preparations for the project. 
Moscow is still delaying (as of February 2012) the transfer of its funds allocated 
for the cross-border programmes. It has only announced that an adequate in-
stalment of funds would be made available after the projects to be subsidised 
as part of the programme have been selected. Since the parties (Poland, Lithu-
ania and Russia) have not been able to agree on the procedure of choice and the 
audit of the projects financed under the programme, there is a risk that the 
European Commission could decide to close this programme.
From Brussels’ point of view, the financial engagement of Russia in this EU pro-
gramme has been unnecessary, and has only given rise to formal difficulties. 
A definitely better and more effective solution would be for Russia to create 
its own programme for frontier areas. Instead, Moscow has made the launch 
of the CBC project dependent on its participation in the financing, and thus 
turned a technical instrument into a political one86.
As a consequence, the approach Moscow has taken towards cross-border co-
operation has in fact caused delays in implementing the Lithuania–Poland–
Russia CBC programme, reducing its efficiency and excluding Russia from the 
Baltic Sea Region Programme. Thus Moscow has been acting contrary to the 
interests of the exclave – the local government, the NGOs and other organi-
sations which could have benefited from EU funds. Furthermore, by margin-
alising the role of the Kaliningrad oblast’s representatives in co-creating the 
project, it has reduced the chance of achieving the main goal of this instrument 
– establishing closer cross-border co-operation between local governments 
and communities87.
85 The second intake of applications began in May 2011, in a similar project being implemented 
by Poland, Belarus and Ukraine.
86 One example of how politics need not influence the functioning of a similar project is the 
Poland–Belarus–Ukraine programme. In late April 2011, despite serious political tension 
between the EU and Belarus, it was decided to open a branch of the Joint Technical Secre-
tariat in Belarus (in Brest), whose task would be to promote the cross-border programme. 
87 Similar problems to those the Lithuania–Poland–Russia programme has been facing, have 
also been encountered by the EU’s cross-border programmes with Latvia, Estonia, Finland 
and Norway in which the Russian Federation is engaged. 
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3. tHe tWo sides oF tHe coin: Kaliningrad’s interests versus 
Moscow’s interests
3.1. the interests of Kaliningrad 
Kaliningrad’s elites are interested in using the opportunities offered by 
the status of Kaliningrad oblast as a subject of the russian Federation and 
also by the special location of this region, surrounded by the european 
union. Its status as part of the Russian Federation allows the regional govern-
ment to obtain subsidies and subventions from the central budget., Additional 
financial support from Moscow has allowed the region to meet its budget obli-
gations, especially during the global economic crisis. Secondly, federal invest-
ments (including those made as part of federal projects designated for specific 
purposes) have made it possible for the region to build and modernise large 
infrastructural facilities. Examples of such investments include the construc-
tion of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant and the modernisation of the airport 
and road infrastructure. Large projects like these also bring (or are intended 
to bring) major economic benefits to the region, although some of them have 
given rise to controversies in the region itself: for example, the construction 
of the nuclear power plant has given rise to concerns about both ecological se-
curity and the increasing influence of big federal capital, and by extension the 
possible marginalisation of the regional elites.
Furthermore, Kaliningrad’s elites have been making efforts to reinforce the 
position of their region within the Russian Federation, which would allow 
them to lobby more successfully for its interests in Moscow. A group of politi-
cians from Kaliningrad (including members of the local parliament) came up 
with a proposal to grant Kaliningrad oblast the status of a special federal dis-
trict, and its governor the status of special presidential envoy, with the rank 
of deputy head of the Presidential Administration88. A draft containing such 
changes was submitted to President Dmitri Medvedev during his visit to Ka-
liningrad oblast in July 2011.
The regional elites also want to capitalise on the region’s location in proxim-
ity to the European Union and the Baltic Sea. This is primarily manifested by 
efforts to liberalise the visa regime with the European Union, which could help 
activate contacts between the exclave and its EU neighbours. For years appeals 
88 See footnote 43.
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
12
54
have been made from this region to decision makers in both Moscow and Brus-
sels, to consider Kaliningrad’s special location during the Russian-EU visa 
talks and make it a ‘pilot’ region, for which the EU would lift the visa require-
ment before doing so with regard to the entire Russian Federation89.
For their part, local business circles are principally interested in improv-
ing the investment climate, which to a large extent is dependent on Moscow. 
One of the economic elite’s top priorities is stability of legislation, which would 
enable them to plan their business activity in the long term and would curb 
corruption and bureaucracy. In comparison to these goals, privileges aimed at 
compensating for the region’s separation from the rest of the country are of 
much less importance to business circles. From the perspective of local busi-
ness representatives, the present functioning of the SEZ serves their inter-
ests to only a limited extent. The benefits are only available to large investors, 
whose number in this region is small; the sectors which were the most active 
in the region until recently have been excluded from the special regime. As 
a consequence, economic preferences are offered to investors from outside the 
region, mainly representatives of federal capital. Therefore, the regional gov-
ernment and the local business elite are lobbying in Moscow for new privileges 
to be developed for the regional entities, which would give due respect to the 
needs of Kaliningrad’s economy, especially after the transitional regulations 
of the SEZ act of 1996 expire. This would allow this region to develop, and an 
influx of investments, especially from abroad, to increase.
The interests of the residents of Kaliningrad oblast are expressed in their 
expectation that the government will create conditions which will allow living 
standards in the region to improve. Social claims are predominant among the 
expectations they have of the government. These expectations are strength-
ened by the awareness of the disproportion between the living standards in 
this region and those in the neighbouring EU member states, which have un-
dergone an effective transformation over the past twenty years. Improving 
the situation in the regional healthcare system is one of the key expectations. 
At the same time, residents of Kaliningrad oblast are more enterprising and 
aware of their citizens’ rights which leads them to criticise the excessive role 
of the state bureaucracy, and contributes to their desire to be given a wider 
89 Governor Nikolay Tsukanov has regularly made such appeals (for example see Itar-Tass, 
30 November 2010), most recently during the meeting of the EU-Russia Parliamentary Co-
operation Committee in Warsaw on 21 September 2011, as have other politicians from Kalin-
ingrad (for example, MP Solomon Ginzburg, kaliningrad.ru, 20 October 2010).
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
12
55
scope of freedoms, especially economic. This also entails a need for pluralism 
and competition, one effect of which in the political area has been the creation 
of a greater number of political parties in the regional parliament (in compari-
son to other regions), and visibly lower support for United Russia, the ‘party of 
power’, than on average across the Russian Federation.
The residents of Kaliningrad oblast also want to benefit from its special lo-
cation by taking advantage of opportunities linked to travel, trade, transfer 
of services, education abroad, business co-operation and collaboration with 
non-governmental organisations. From this point of view, lifting the travel 
barriers to the EU is a key issue. The residents of Kaliningrad oblast would 
support any travel facilitations which could make the existing regime more 
liberal. The optimal solution for them would be visa-free movement between 
the EU and Russia. However, since this perspective is remote, they are ready 
to accept facilitations within the existing regime, including the introduction 
of a local border traffic regime with their neighbours, Poland and Lithuania, 
especially as the version adopted is intended to cover the entire Kaliningrad 
oblast, as well as several big cities and frontier counties in Poland (see box 6). 
It has to be said, though, that the region’s business elites oppose the local 
border traffic concept, as they fear that existing border checkpoints could be 
blocked by numerous travellers. The region’s residents are also interested in 
maintaining and even increasing transport subsidies, thanks to which the 
costs of their travel to other regions of Russia and the costs of bringing goods 
from there are lower.
3.2. Moscow’s interests with regard to Kaliningrad
Moscow’s interests with regard to Kaliningrad oblast fit in with the general 
logic of the country’s rule, defined by the political elite linked to Vladimir 
Putin. This concept is based on the desire to centralise power and limit the 
autonomy of other political and business entities. In the regional aspect, the 
centralisation policy boils down to imposing stricter financial, political and 
administrative control over the regions.
In the case of Kaliningrad oblast, Moscow’s urge to stick with its centralisa-
tion policy is intensified by the region’s location as an exclave surrounded by 
EU and NATO member states. Moscow has been using Kaliningrad oblast 
as a tool of its foreign policy, principally to put pressure on its partners 
in the West (the USA, NATO and the European Union), be it regarding security 
or political issues, such as visa negotiations. For Moscow, the unique location 
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of the region is not so much an opportunity to deepen relations with the EU 
(which could put Kaliningrad in the vanguard of integration with Europe) and 
develop mutually beneficial conditions for co-operation with Russia as a whole.
Kaliningrad oblast is of strategic importance for Moscow in terms of defence. 
Over the past few years, Moscow has been developing military infrastructure 
in this region, thus reinforcing the country’s military potential. This potential 
is used by Moscow as a bargaining chip in geopolitical games, including with 
regard to the security policies of the United States and Central European coun-
tries (such as Poland) which envisages the deployment of strategic elements of 
the US missile defence system in Central Europe. In response to these plans, 
Russia has built a radar station and deployed Iskander missile launchers in Ka-
liningrad oblast. This is supposed to discourage Central European countries 
(including Poland) from backing the US security policy. Kaliningrad is also an 
important element of Russian energy security strategy; one reason for build-
ing the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant is the desire to reinforce Russia’s position on 
the energy market in the Baltic region.
As regards internal issues, the priorities of Moscow’s regional policy include 
the desire to maintain a stable situation in the regions, first of all as regards 
social and political issues (preventing public unrest, making sure that the par-
ties and candidates linked to the federal elite achieve good results in elections). 
Moscow wants Russia to remain the most important point of reference in so-
cio-political and cultural fields for the residents of Kaliningrad oblast. This is 
why it is ill-disposed to any solutions which would make this region more open 
to its EU neighbours, fearing that this could loosen the bonds between Kalinin-
grad oblast and the rest of Russia. Intensive contacts between Kaliningrad and 
EU member states would make the oblast’s residents more receptive to Euro-
pean standards, which are different from Russia’s, including those concerning 
democracy, elections and political & civic activity.
Moscow’s economic interests with regard to Kaliningrad oblast are limited; 
this region has no large deposits of raw materials, and its low economic poten-
tial prevents it from yielding high revenues to the federal budget
3.3. the conflicts of interests between Kaliningrad and Moscow
Although the government and residents of Kaliningrad oblast have not called 
the integrity of the Russian Federation into question, and accept with satis-
faction the economic privileges and subsidies offered to them by Moscow, the 
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central government and the region still disagree about the way the Kremlin’s 
regional policy should be implemented. These differences of opinion primarily 
concern how to deal with this region’s location, the exclave. Moscow does not 
see any need to strengthen the region’s administrative status in the Russian 
Federation (for example, by granting it federal district status). Nor did it sup-
port Kaliningrad’s proposals concerning its contacts with the neighbouring 
EU member states (such as making it a pilot region for establishing visa-free 
movement with the entire European Union), and has instead negotiated the 
introduction of a local border traffic regime in this region with Poland.
Another area of disagreement (which is typical for many Russian regions) is the 
instability of legislation (especially concerning economic issues) and its incom-
patibility with the region’s real needs. An example of this problem is the chang-
ing regulations concerning the Special Economic Zone, which additionally dis-
regard the small and medium-sized businesses which are active in this region.
In turn, the socio-political situation in Kaliningrad has failed to meet the pri-
orities set in the Kremlin’s policy. The centre’s anxiety is caused by the peri-
odical protest actions partly targeted against the policy of the central govern-
ment, as well as the below-average results which the parties and politicians 
linked to the federal government elite have achieved in elections.
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ii. co-operAtion despite diFFicuLties: Kaliningrad  
and its eu neighbourhood
1. europe’s peripHery: the eu’s relations with the region so far
1.1. Kaliningrad in the european union’s policy
The European Union perceives Kaliningrad oblast primarily as one of the Rus-
sian Federation regions, and for the EU, co-operation with it is an element of re-
lations with Russia as a whole. However, the region’s unique location ensures it 
special treatment in these relations; Brussels claims that Kaliningrad has stra-
tegic importance for both Russia and the EU90. The EU declares that relations 
with Kaliningrad oblast should serve to intensify co-operation with rus-
sia as a whole, and should at the same time bring living standards in this 
region up to a level similar to that in the neighbouring eu member states. 
On the one hand, Brussels emphasises the need to respect the territorial integri-
ty of the Russian Federation by ensuring an effective transit of people and goods 
between this region and the rest of Russia. However, on the other hand, the EU 
is making efforts to ensure the cohesion of the entire Baltic Sea macro-region, 
especially regarding socio-economic and environmental issues.
In 2003, the European Union and the Russian Federation signed an agreement 
to facilitate transit of people between Kaliningrad oblast and the rest of Russia 
after Lithuania joined the EU. The common arrangements made in 2004 in turn 
included rules for the transit of goods to and from the region. Furthermore, 
programmes for the modernisation and development of border infrastructure 
were launched to facilitate the transit of people and goods.
On the macro-regional scale, co-operation with Kaliningrad oblast is speci-
fied within the framework of the Northern Dimension of the EU and the EU 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Kaliningrad oblast participates in these 
initiatives, along with the north-western regions of the Russian Federation. 
The Northern Dimension, initiated in 1999, is a policy aimed at establishing 
closer co-operation in the Baltic Sea and Arctic regions to ensure sustainable 
development (in the broad meaning of the term) in this area. It envisages the 
equal participation of EU member states, the Russian Federation, Norway and 
90 See for example http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/eu_russia/fields_cooperation/
regional_issues/kaliningrad/index_en.htm 
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Iceland in the creation of this policy91. Projects in the areas of economic co-
operation, ecology, nuclear safety, civil defence, development of scientific re-
search and culture, social security and healthcare, internal affairs and justice 
are implemented as part of the Northern Dimension. Entities from Kaliningrad 
oblast, namely regional and local governments, public institutions and higher 
education facilities, have taken part in projects in all these areas. However, the 
Russian side has failed to meet many of these projects’ co-financing require-
ments, and this cooperation has therefore encountered many difficulties. For 
example, problems of this nature have caused serious delays in implementing 
a flagship project aimed at modernising the water-and-sewerage and heating 
networks in Kaliningrad, which was first announced in 200092. Although com-
pletion was scheduled for 2005, its implementation is still underway in 2012. 
Among the projects that are usually implemented successfully there are the 
so-called soft projects, such as youth exchange and training events.
In 2008 a EU strategy for the Baltic Sea Region was initiated, designed to coor-
dinate and revive co-operation between the countries in this area, by compil-
ing the existing initiatives, partnerships and platforms of co-operation. How-
ever, in the case of Kaliningrad oblast this strategy has failed, as it assumes 
that only EU member states may be its full participants, who decide on the 
priorities and directions of action. Other countries of this macro-region may 
only be co-operating partners of the EU members. This seemingly minor role is 
unacceptable to Russia, and although Moscow is formally participating in the 
strategy, it shows no particular interest in the initiatives launched as part of it.
Co-operation with Kaliningrad oblast may also take place within two cross-
border programmes: Poland–Lithuania–Russia (Kaliningrad oblast only) and 
the Baltic Sea Region (with the other north-western regions of Russia). How-
ever, there are also many impediments to implementing these programmes 
(for more details see part I, section 2.4.2). Residents of Kaliningrad oblast 
may also benefit from all the programmes in which the Russian Federation’s 
91 Other entities engaged in the activities taken as part of the Northern Direction include: 
the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Nordic Council of Ministers, financial institutions, 
namely the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment 
Bank and the Nordic Investment Bank, regional and supraregional organisations and non-
governmental organisations. 
92 The programme is worth €25 million in total. It is financed, along with EU entities, by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Swedish International Devel-
opment Co-operation Agency (SIDA).
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participation is envisaged, such as the educational programmes Tempus and 
Erasmus Mundus.
EU support for Kaliningrad oblast between 1991 and 2006 totalled approxi-
mately €100 million, of which €25 million were funds offered under the EU’s 
TACIS programme to stimulate the exclave’s socio-economic growth. The cur-
rent financial framework (2007–2013) offers €50 million of aid to Kaliningrad 
oblast. The EU’s support for this region is focused on such areas as: protect-
ing the natural environment (sewage treatment plants and monitoring pollu-
tion in the Baltic Sea), developing the border infrastructure and an integrated 
border management system, developing small and medium-sized businesses, 
improving energy saving and energy efficiency, healthcare (including coun-
teracting drug addiction, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis), increasing the potential 
of the region’s administration (especially in the context of handling business 
entities), and academic co-operation93.
Examples of the largest EU projects in this region include: 
– the construction of the Chernyshevskoye high-capacity border crossing point 
on the oblast’s border with Lithuania (opened in 2009), with an EU contribu-
tion of €8 million;
– the construction of the road border crossing point in Mamonovo on the 
oblast’s border with Poland (opened in December 2010), with an EU contribu-
tion of €13.3 million;
– co-financing the construction of the sewage treatment plant in Gusev (opened 
in 2009), with an EU contribution of €3 million;
– the programme for co-financing the modernisation of sewage treatment 
plants in the region, with an EU contribution of €9.5 million;
– the project for improving the qualifications of the local administration (e-
administration), with a total budget of €6.7 million.
93 Every year, various kinds of foreign grants are received by hundreds of students from high-
er education schools in Kaliningrad oblast. Academic workers are also being exchanged 
(approximately 150 university teachers from universities in Kaliningrad oblast visit foreign 
higher-education institutions annually). 
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The immediate beneficiary of the EU’s aid in the region is predominantly the 
public sector, which has been more successful in obtaining funds from the EU 
than non-governmental organisations. State organisations have more experi-
ence in international co-operation and easier access to funds for ensuring their 
own contribution (for example, in the case of cross-border projects, they must 
contribute 10% themselves). However, in many cases even the government’s 
engagement does not guarantee that the project will be successful. Barriers to 
co-operation arise due to problems with co-financing events, insufficient com-
petences and the inefficiency of the local bureaucracy. For example, despite the 
huge demand for environmental programmes in this region, it was only possi-
ble to obtain €2.5 million euros for six projects from LIFE, a key EU programme 
focused on co-financing activities to protect the environment94.
1.2. Kaliningrad’s contacts with its eu neighbours 
Kaliningrad oblast has been co-operating with its neighbours within EU pro-
grammes and initiatives, and also within the framework of bilateral relations. 
Co-operation between Kaliningrad oblast and the EU member states located in 
its immediate or close neighbourhood (including Lithuania, Poland, Germany 
and Sweden) usually takes place at the regional and local levels. Local gov-
ernments (provinces, cities and municipalities) are partners for Kaliningrad 
oblast. This co-operation is also supported by the consular agencies of Poland, 
Lithuania, Germany, Latvia and Sweden within the oblast95.
In addition to treaties signed by individual countries, bilateral relations are 
based on a number of agreements concerning regional co-operation. In 1992, 
Poland and Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement on co-operation 
between the north-eastern provinces of Poland and Kaliningrad oblast, under 
which the Polish-Russian Council for Co-operation of Regions of Poland with 
Kaliningrad Oblast was established. In 1991 Lithuania and the Russian Feder-
ation entered into an agreement on co-operation with Kaliningrad oblast in 
the areas of economic, social and cultural development; an intergovernmental 
94 For comparison, €1.36 billion were allocated in 1992–2006 from the LIFE fund for the im-
plementation of 2750 projects worth a total of €4 billion in forty countries and regions. The 
programme’s budget for 2007–2013 is €2.14 billion. For more, see http://ec.europa.eu/envi-
ronment/life/ 
95 Sweden had its own consulate in Kaliningrad until 2011. At present, its consul has his office 
in the Consulate of Poland. Honorary consuls of Croatia, Italy and Denmark are also pre-
sent in Kaliningrad oblast. Of the CIS countries, Belarus and Armenia have representatives 
there. 
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agreement on co-operation between Lithuanian regions and the regions of Ka-
liningrad oblast was concluded in 1999. Lithuania’s and Poland’s contacts with 
Kaliningrad are also based on numerous local deals and agreements, such as 
partnerships of cities and municipalities, partnership agreements between 
institutions, and as part of the Euroregions96 (Baltic, Neman, Saule, Sesupe 
and Lyna-Lava). Joint projects have to a great extent been financed by funds 
allocated for cross-border co-operation by the EU (a total of €46 million was 
allocated for this purpose in 2004–200697). One of the examples of the actions 
taken is the creation of the tourist route along the castles and museums of the 
Baltic Sea region, with the participation of Bagrationovsk town from Kalinin-
grad oblast. One-third of the €132 million allocated for the EU’s Cross-Border 
Cooperation programme for 2007–2013 comes from the budgets of Poland and 
Lithuania. Given the difficulties in implementing the CBC programme, Poland 
and Lithuania (and especially their regions which border Kaliningrad oblast) 
have also made efforts to continue co-operation, both within their own capac-
ity (grants for academic co-operation and school exchanges & funds for co-op-
eration offered by regions, municipalities and institutions), and by obtaining 
funds from other sources98. For example, ‘Kaliningrad Days’ are celebrated in 
the frontier provinces of Poland and in Lithuania as part of this co-operation99. 
Co-operation in the field of culture and historical heritage is also developing 
intensively; Russia and Lithuania are preparing for the 300th anniversary in 
2014 of the birth of the Lithuanian poet Kristijonas Donelaitis, who was born 
and lived in what is present-day Kaliningrad oblast.
Germany has also shown interest in co-operation with the exclave. It has 
been engaged on the national and federal state levels, and also via German 
96 A Euroregion is a form of cross-border co-operation between member states of the Euro-
pean Union and their neighbouring regions. Representatives of local and regional govern-
ments take part in the creation of a Euroregion.
97 TACIS allocated €9.5 million to Kaliningrad oblast as part of this pool. 
98 Good examples of this are the Ostbalticum archaeological project, which has been imple-
mented for many years with the participation of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Germany and 
Russia under the auspices of UNESCO, as part of which the catalogue of the collection of the 
Prussian Museum in Königsberg has been restored and developed; and the co-operation of 
the Elbląg Mediation Centre with psychological support centres in Kaliningrad, as part of 
grants offered by the Polish-American Freedom Foundation.
99 Thanks to these contacts, Kaliningrad oblast and the Warmia & Mazury Province signed 
a three-year plan for common enterprises in 2011. For example, participation in joint exhi-
bition events, the continuation of the regattas in the Vistula Lagoon, the meetings of war 
veterans on the anniversary of Victory Day and co-operation between Kaliningrad’s Musi-
cal Theatre and the Jaracz Theatre in Olsztyn have been planned. 
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foundations active in Russia100. It is difficult to estimate the total size of Ger-
man support for Kaliningrad oblast, due to large number and diverse nature 
of the projects. The main project at federal level is the Russian-German House, 
which serves as an organisational base for German entities implementing pro-
jects in this region101. These projects are primarily linked to education, agri-
culture, economic development and healthcare102. One of the higher-profile 
German projects in this region is the Klaus Mehnert European Institute, the 
two-semester post-graduate European studies course at the Kaliningrad State 
Technical University, the only course of this kind in Russia103. German funds 
have been used to restore Kaliningrad’s former cathedral, where the Kant 
Museum and a concert hall now operate. Initiatives for supporting the recon-
struction of the region’s historical heritage have intensified over the past few 
years. Associations of the former residents of this region and their families 
are especially active in this area. Contacts between people are also develop-
ing quite rapidly: numerous exchange programmes function at the level of 
federal states and individual cities, and a wide range of grants are available 
for residents of Kaliningrad oblast104. German federal states (Mecklenburg and 
Schleswig-Holstein), jointly with Polish provinces (Pomeranian, West Pomera-
nian and Warmia-Mazury), have created the Southern Baltic Sea Parliamen-
tary Forum, an organisation intended at implementing European programmes 
as part of the EU maritime, tourism and youth policies. The German Ministry 
for the Natural Environment also organises the Russian-German Ecology Days 
in Kaliningrad, which were held for the eighth time in 2011.
Sweden, which primarily supports initiatives aimed at improving the ecologi-
cal situation in the region, should also be mentioned among the EU member 
states which are strongly involved in co-operation with Kaliningrad oblast. 
The Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) offered 
100 This especially applies to foundations which have their offices in Russia: the Adenauer 
Foundation, the Ebert Foundation, the Boell Foundation, the Naumann Foundation, the 
Seidel Foundation and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. 
101 It also performs the function of a culture institute, since it organises cultural events and 
language courses, and also supports the German minority residents in Kaliningrad oblast. 
102 Co-operation is also conducted through joint projects of medical associations from Kalinin-
grad oblast and the German federal state of Schleswig-Holstein. 
103 The institute is financed by the Robert Bosch Foundation and the Moellgaard Foundation, 
with organisational support from the German Ministry of Education and the German Aca-
demic Exchange Service DAAD. 
104 Grants are offered by the German Academic Exchange Service DAAD, the Deutsche Bun-
desstiftung Umwelt foundation, Albertina, and the Moellgaard Foundation among other 
institutions.
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over US$17 million in 2003–2007 for the construction and modernisation of 
water and sewage infrastructure and sewage treatment plants in Kaliningrad 
oblast. The southern regions of Sweden are also active; they participate in co-
operation both as donors to small projects and as participants in initiatives and 
programmes aimed at building people-to-people contacts.
The openness of the regional government is conducive to developing contacts 
between Kaliningrad oblast and its EU neighbours. These contacts have inten-
sified since September 2010, when Nikolay Tsukanov was nominated gover-
nor of this region. The governor has visited to Poland on numerous occasions, 
both on official visits and unofficially (he took part in the Poland-Kaliningrad 
motorcycle rally to Braniewo in May 2011). The initiative of informal meetings 
between the Kaliningrad oblast governor and the governors of the Pomerani-
an and the Warmia & Mazury Provinces, the ‘Cup of Three Governors’ (a joint 
sailing regatta in the Vistula Lagoon) is also continuing. Nikolay Tsukanov has 
also paid visits to Lithuania. On the occasions of his visits to the neighbouring 
EU member states, the governor has consistently raised the issue of visa fa-
cilitations for Kaliningrad oblast, and expressed interest in welcoming foreign 
investors to his region.
Contacts between residents of this region and their neighbours in the EU, 
mainly Poland, Lithuania and Germany, are also developing rapidly. It is worth 
noting that residents of Kaliningrad oblast account for most of the traffic in 
these contacts, while citizens of the EU member states visit Kaliningrad oblast 
noticeably less frequently. Residents of Kaliningrad oblast usually travel to the 
EU for commercial purposes (popular weekend shopping trips to Poland and 
Lithuania), and as tourists (both for rest and relaxation, and also as ‘medical 
tourists’ due to the higher prices of medical services in Kaliningrad oblast).
The consulates of Poland and Lithuania issue the most visas to residents of Ka-
liningrad oblast; the German consulate and the Latvian consular office issue 
fewer visas. The number of visas issued has been constantly rising over the 
past few years (for more see box 7), which has become possible owing to the 
modernisation of the consulates and the introduction of more up-to-date pro-
cedures, for example the possibility of online registration105. EU consulates also 
use various kinds of visa facilitations, such as free-of-charge visas for children 
105 According to information from the Polish consulate, it takes four business days on average 
to obtain a visa from the moment of submitting the application. 
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under 12, or the requirement to declare a hotel reservation (instead of proof of 
payment for accommodation).
Box 7. Visas issued for Kaliningrad residents
In 2011, the Polish consulate issued almost 113,000 visas, of which 53,500 
were multiple-entry visas. The Lithuanian consulate issued a total of al-
most 83,000 visas in 2011, the German consulate issued 21,700 visas, and 
the Latvian consular office issued almost 8000 visas.
In 2010, the Lithuanian consulate issued 55,000 visas, 37% of which were mul-
tiple-entry visas. The Polish consulate issued approximately 40,000 visas in 
2010 (twice as many as the year before; 40% of these were multiple-entry vi-
sas), the German consulate issued approximately 20,000 visas, and the Latvi-
an consular office issued 6500 visas (50% of which were multiple-entry visas).
1.3. economic co-operation
The European Union is interested in the economic development of Kaliningrad 
oblast and raising its living standards. The economic decline in the region in 
the 1990s raised concerns in the EU that the exclave could turn into a European 
poverty area. The EU’s actions have been focused on preventing the differences 
in living standards from deepening. Brussels became interested in the region 
again when the decision was made that the region’s immediate neighbours, 
Poland and Lithuania, would join the EU. Apart from transit questions, this 
entailed the need to regulate such issues as the development of border infra-
structure, and the transmission of electric power via Lithuania in connection 
with the need to adjust the Lithuanian system to that used in the EU106.
However, the region’s significance in eu-russia economic relations 
is limited. From the EU’s perspective, Kaliningrad oblast is of most impor-
tance as a recipient of EU exports to Russia. The value of these exports in 2010 
reached approximately €90 billion, around 7% of which went to Kaliningrad 
oblast. This region is an important recipient of goods, especially from Slovakia 
(it accounts for over 30% of Slovakia’s total exports to Russia, which is a result 
of the supply of components for car assembly in the region), and from Poland 
106 For more on the EU policy towards Kaliningrad oblast, see the website of the EU’s Delega-
tion to Russia http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia/index_en.htm 
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(approximately 12%). Over the past few years, the role of EU suppliers to this 
region has been lessening as entities from China and South Korea have become 
increasingly active.
In turn, Kaliningrad oblast is of marginal significance for EU imports and in-
vestments. This region accounts for less than 1% of total EU imports from Rus-
sia; the proportion of EU investments in this country is similar. The EU mem-
ber states which border Kaliningrad oblast in this context are relatively more 
involved. Polish business entities co-operate with this region quite intensively 
(in 2010, in terms of intensity of co-operation, Kaliningrad came fourth after 
Moscow, Saint Petersburg and Moscow oblast). At the end of 2010, total Pol-
ish investments in this region were estimated at US$57 million (Polish firms 
invested more only in the Novgorod and Moscow oblasts, and in the city of 
Moscow), which meant that almost 10% of Polish investments in Russia went 
to this region107. Kaliningrad oblast is also a relatively important investment 
destination for Lithuanian business entities; by the end of 2010, approximately 
25% of Lithuanian capital invested in Russia (around US$40 million) went to 
Kaliningrad oblast. At the same time, this region played only a marginal role 
in Lithuanian exports to Russia (approximately 6%)108.
Support for foreign capital is offered by numerous organisations and associa-
tions which provide them with information on the region and help establish 
cooperation with local entities. These include the Kaliningrad Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, the regional Economic Development Agency and an 
association of international experts for the development of Kaliningrad oblast. 
Organisations which lobby for the interests of entrepreneurs are also active, 
such as the Foreign Investors Association in the Kaliningrad region109 and the 
Baltic Business Club, an organisation representing small and medium-sized 
businesses. Additionally, German firms are supported by the Committee on 
Eastern European Economic Relations (Ost­Ausschuss) and the Agency of the 
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in Kaliningrad.
107 For more on this issue, see the website of the Promotion and Investments Department of the 
Polish Embassy in Moscow, http://www.moskwa.trade.gov.pl
108 Our own calculations, on the basis of information from the Lithuanian Central Bank and 
the Ministry of Economy of Kaliningrad Oblast. 
109 Its members number approximately fifty investors from various countries, predominantly 
from Lithuania. For more, see www.fiak.biz
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2. co-operAtion WitH KALininGrAd: conclusions for eu policy 
2.1. co-operation at the federal level
Since Moscow decides on most issues concerning the principles of co-opera-
tion between Kaliningrad oblast and its neighbours, the EU and its member 
states must adopt a double-track approach to continuing the development 
of these relations. Their actions should include talks at both federal level 
(this especially applies to issues such as the movement of people, goods & 
services, infrastructural solutions, and the rules of economic co-operation 
with the region) and local level (such as establishing closer co-operation 
with the local government in Kaliningrad and involving it in regional ini-
tiatives).
2.1.1. supporting bilateral contacts: visa and border issues
Russia and the EU have been making attempts for several years to develop 
a plan for the gradual introduction of a visa-free regime in their mutual 
relations. These talks have encountered numerous political and technical 
barriers, and the prospect of a visa-free regime between the EU and Rus-
sia still seems remote. On the other hand, the local border traffic regime 
between Kaliningrad oblast and Poland has been introduced (for more on 
this issue see part I, section 2.4.1.). However, its implementation does not 
mean that efforts to introduce visa facilitations in travel to the European 
Union need not be made, because local border traffic only covers some lim-
ited areas in Poland. Therefore, it is worth seeking a gradual liberalisation 
of the existing visa regime between the EU and the Russian Federation, and 
to make the requirements more f lexible: shortening the visa wait time, re-
ducing the formal requirements (invitations, vouchers, money for travel), 
increasing the number of long-term visas issued, and reducing the visa 
prices. Both in implementing the local border traffic regime with Poland 
and in the quest for visa facilitation with the entire European Union, it is 
worth improving the functioning and capacity of the border as much as 
possible; this would include creating more ‘green corridors’110 at the bor-
der for travellers which have nothing to declare, and even considering the 
110 Two ‘green corridors’ are functioning at present on the border with Kaliningrad oblast: at 
the road border crossing points with Lithuania (Chernyshevskoye-Kybartai) and Poland 
(Grzechotki-Mamonovo-2).
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feasibility of reopening currently inactive border crossings111. In the case of 
Kaliningrad oblast, the risk of illegal migration into the EU is minimal; the 
limited threat this exclave may pose for the EU is that of smuggling112.
Another important question which the EU should raise in talks with Moscow 
is the lack of symmetry in mutual requirements with regard to travellers. This 
firstly concerns the Russian requirement for foreigners to register their stay 
within seven days of entering the country. Another topic for discussion should 
be the restricted access for foreigners to one-third of the Kaliningrad oblast’s 
territory (see part I, section 2.3.1.) and the lack of proper marking of these re-
stricted zones. The EU member states which are directly interested in co-op-
eration with Kaliningrad oblast, for example Poland, Lithuania and Germany, 
could play an essential role in this context.
2.1.2. co-operation between societies and local governments
When considering co-operation with this region at the local authority level, we 
should bear in mind that the competences of the local government in Kalin-
ingrad oblast are more restricted in comparison to those of their equivalents 
from the EU. Most decisions can be passed only following approval from Mos-
cow. Even if the decisions formally fall within the competences of the local gov-
ernment, any declarations, arrangements and even documents signed can be 
questioned by Moscow, if the latter deems them unfavourable from the point 
of view of its own interests.
We must also be aware that the local government has no access to the funds 
necessary for co-financing large projects, and so such issues must be arranged 
with Moscow. Even if Moscow gives its formal consent to co-operation be-
tween Kaliningrad oblast and the EU, it may still block it later by withholding 
the transfer of funds. Funds can be rejected for a project if it is deemed to have 
lower priority than other needs on the scale of the entire Russian Federation 
(as has been the case with the sewage treatment plants in Kaliningrad). At the 
same time, it must be stressed that it was Moscow who insisted on co-financing 
the cross-border co-operation programmes, and now Russia treats its financial 
111 In the debate on possible problems with the border infrastructure’s capacity following 
the introduction of the local border traffic, members of Kaliningrad’s parliament have ap-
pealed for the resumption of traffic on the border checkpoints which are now not in use, 
namely Perly-Krylovo and Mikhalkovo-Zheleznodorozhny. http://www.kaliningrad.net/
news/49259/.
112 Frontex report, data from the Polish Border Guard Service.
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participation as a tool of control in co-operation between the EU and Kalinin-
grad oblast (an example of which is the problem already mentioned with Mos-
cow signing the Financial Agreements as part of the CBC programmes).
2.1.3. the intensification of economic co-operation
Most economic issues, such as the principles of the region’s co-operation with 
foreign partners or the general rules of doing business, are regulated at the 
federal level by means of laws, decrees and international agreements. For this 
reason, it is Moscow that should be the main addressee of proposals to improve 
the protection of EU investments, facilitate access to the exclave’s market, cre-
ate better conditions for the operation of small and medium enterprises (the 
most active sector in the EU), etc.
From the point of view of EU business, it is necessary to create legally binding 
regulations for EU-Russia economic co-operation and effective mechanisms 
for resolving disputes, which should be included in the principal agreement 
currently under negotiation (the so-called PCA-2)113. Russian accession to the 
WTO, which is to take place in 2012, may prove helpful in this context. The 
implementation of the obligations Russia has assumed will be especially im-
portant, as these could lead to curbing corruption and improving economic 
competition on the market. To ensure that provisions which successfully pro-
tect EU business are included in the agreement, the EU must adopt a uniform 
stance, and the member states must offer support to the European Commis-
sion. Co-operation programmes in individual areas, such as the Partnership 
for Modernisation and the Partnership for Innovation (whether with the EU 
as a whole or with its individual member states) must also be negotiated at the 
federal level. Once approved by Moscow, such programmes may contribute to 
intensifying co-operation at the regional level.
A major impact on relations with Kaliningrad oblast could come from the imple-
mentation of the project envisaging the construction of the Baltic nuclear 
power plant. on the one hand, it could allow the eu to establish closer rela-
tions with russia and Kaliningrad oblast; but on the other, it would rein-
force russia’s position on the energy market in the Baltic sea region, and 
thus reduce the energy security of poland, Lithuania, Latvia and estonia.
113 The PCA currently binding on Russia and the EU signed in 1997 is asymmetrical in nature, 
and less beneficial for the EU and its member states. In turn it offers Russia numerous privi-
leges and great freedom in its trade policy, yet fails to introduce an effective mechanism for 
resolving disputes between the EU and Russia. 
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Given the planned increase of demand for electric power in the EU, and the im-
plementation of the climate policy by the member states (which fosters energy 
sources with low levels of greenhouse gas emissions), the nuclear power plant’s 
output could contribute to improving the energy balance in the EU. However, 
prospective investors expect the project to be made more attractive to them, 
and the conditions offered by Moscow to be improved. First, the investors ex-
pect guarantees of the rights of the minority shareholders: a 49% stake has 
been reserved for foreign investors, which in Russian realities means complete 
dependence on the state-owned investor (Rosatom). Secondly, protection from 
rapidly increasing investment costs needs to be ensured; this problem has al-
ready arisen with other infrastructural investments, such as Nord Stream114.
Foreign investors interested in building the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant in co-
operation with Rosatom can improve their negotiating position by taking advan-
tage of Russia’s need for this project to be internationalised, i.e. to be co-financed 
by foreign investors, to have EU recipients of the energy produced by the plant 
and to ensure the routes for its transmission. Rosatom has not signed any agree-
ments with importers, has not been given any clear declarations by potential 
recipients, and has not decided on the energy transmission route so far. Another 
element which makes the position of foreign investors stronger may be Rosatom’s 
interest in intensifying its foreign activity (this especially concerns the export of 
Russian technologies and nuclear fuel), as well as the need to use the project in 
Kaliningrad oblast to establish closer relations with its foreign partners.
From the point of view of the Baltic Sea countries (Poland. Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia, to name a few) which heavily rely on the Russian oil and gas sec-
tor, the construction of the Baltic Nuclear Power Plant may further strengthen 
Russia’s position on their energy markets. For this reason, the most important 
thing for the countries in this region is to focus on building up their energy 
security by introducing energy saving programmes, and developing & mod-
ernising their own power plants and infrastructural connections, which could 
ensure a greater diversification of energy supplies and transmission routes in 
114 However, the experience of implementing energy projects in Russia with the participation 
of foreign investors so far has shown that their success depends primarily on the politi-
cal decisions taken by the Russian government, and not on economic calculations. For ex-
ample, the majority stake held by Shell in the Sakhalin-2 oil and gas project and its long-
term agreement with the Russian government failed to protect this company from losing 
control of the project and having to relinquish it to Gazprom in 2006. For more, see Iwona 
Wiśniewska, ‘Controlled opening-up of Russia’s energy sector to foreign investors’, East­
Week, 9 March 2011.
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this region. In particular, Poland and Lithuania’s focus on building their own 
nuclear power plants would be of especial importance.
2.2. co-operation at the regional level
Although the key decisions concerning the exclave are made by Moscow, the re-
gional government does play a role in developing co-operation with the neigh-
bours. It can use its limited competences to support co-operation with foreign 
partners.
2.2.1. regional political contacts
The success of projects implemented in co-operation with Kaliningrad oblast 
depends to a great extent on how the region is governed, and on the stance 
adopted by its governor and his aides. Maintaining good, regular contacts be-
tween the administration of Kaliningrad oblast and the local governments of 
its neighbouring countries, Poland and Lithuania, contributes to the success-
ful handling of concrete issues. This co-operation may have become easier ow-
ing to the fact that Governor Nikolay Tsukanov has a reputation of a successful 
manager, and to his interest in establishing contacts with Poland and Lithu-
ania. One example of the success of these direct contacts at the regional level 
is the decision to reintroduce the maritime connection between Gdansk and 
Baltiysk as of autumn 2010, following the visit by representatives of the Po-
meranian Province to the exclave.
Bilateral contacts also contribute to reinforcing the image of the new EU mem-
ber states (especially Poland and Lithuania) as positive examples of transfor-
mation, which Kaliningrad’s elites and public will want to model themselves 
on. At the same time, these contacts and co-operation with Kaliningrad need to 
be seen within a longer timeframe because, judging from previous experience, 
the existing conditions for co-operation are unlikely to improve soon.
2.2.2. contacts between societies and local governments
It is worth using the proximity of Kaliningrad oblast and its openness to co-
operation to continue the development of people-to-people contacts. This es-
pecially concerns the neighbouring countries, whose local governments, com-
munities and institutions are also interested in closer collaboration. It is not 
only the mere implementation of a given project which is valuable here, but 
also the fact that it contributes to building people-to-people contacts, which 
may result in doing away with stereotypes and thus increase the potential for 
further co-operation.
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The relatively small size of Kaliningrad oblast means that even projects with 
a limited budget and a small number of participants may bring about significant 
changes in particular areas. When co-operating with Kaliningrad, it is worth 
targeting efforts and funds at precisely determined goals, and setting oneself the 
task of making the most comprehensive changes possible in selected areas.
From the European Union’s point of view, projects with small budgets (so-
called micro-projects) may prove effective. These can be financed at the level 
of local communities, institutions and organisations from Kaliningrad oblast. 
The fact that their objective is to resolve local problems that are of key impor-
tance to the residents, and that the entire decision-making process is within 
the competences of the local government, may also contribute to their success-
ful implementation.
Actions in sectors which are seen as apolitical appear to stand the greatest 
chance for success in co-operation with Kaliningrad oblast (although these, 
too, can be politicised by Moscow, as has happened with the CBC). One such 
area where the exclave’s co-operation with the countries from the entire Baltic 
Sea region could be improved is ecology. Co-operation in this area may be rela-
tively trouble-free because Moscow is also interested in resolving the region’s 
ecological problems. This kind of co-operation requires both investment pro-
jects and public education to promote pro-ecological behaviour.
Another area of co-operation could be projects targeted at improving the situa-
tion in the healthcare system in Kaliningrad oblast, which is in a serious crisis. 
This region needs great support in this area, in the form of both investments 
and education. Failure to prevent the development of diseases such as HIV 
/ AIDS and tuberculosis, as well as influenza and unusual varieties of it (by 
treatment, prevention, and education) will worsen the social situation in the 
region and pose a potential threat to neighbouring countries.
The most durable results for developing co-operation can be achieved by joint 
educational projects. Academic centres in Kaliningrad oblast are already more 
active in this regard in comparison to the rest of Russia, for example in terms 
of the percentage of students and academic staff engaged in international ex-
change. It is worth taking advantage of this positive experience and intensify-
ing exchanges, internships and grants.
An important, albeit sensitive, area of co-operation is linked to the protec-
tion and reconstruction of the region’s historical heritage. Kaliningrad’s 
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intellectual elite are interested in saving the historical heritage of this region; 
they are looking for opportunities to finance the reconstruction, renovation 
and maintenance of the historical buildings and sites. Since this area has been 
neglected for over sixty years, the scale of investment needed is vast. On this 
occasion, positive examples of co-operation in this field can be mentioned, 
such as the reconstruction of Kaliningrad’s cathedral, which has mainly been 
funded by Germany. Investments in protecting the historical heritage could 
also offer a greater chance to develop tourism in this region.
However, it is worth keeping in mind that the limited availability of funds for 
partners from Kaliningrad may pose a barrier to co-operation, especially in 
the case of European projects, where co-financing by Russia is required. Other 
barriers include the lack of adequate competences at the regional level and, 
typical of Russia as a whole, excessive bureaucracy, corruption and a poor legal 
culture.
2.2.3. economic co-operation
Despite the numerous weaknesses of Kaliningrad’s economy and the limited 
attractiveness of the preferences granted to this region by Moscow, co-oper-
ation with it can be beneficial for partners from the EU; for example, because 
of its geographical proximity and high demand for imports and investments. 
However, this co-operation will be attractive mainly to small and medium in-
vestors from the EU operating on the Kaliningrad market. As seen from the 
perspective of large corporations, Kaliningrad’s attractiveness is limited due 
to its small market and the access impeded for products manufactured in this 
region to the EU (caused by the need to meet EU standards) and to the rest of 
Russia (transit costs).
Sectors where co-operation can develop especially fruitfully include agricul-
ture and food industry. These sectors are underdeveloped and unable to satisfy 
the needs of the exclave. The region lacks not only agricultural machinery and 
technologies but also experience. It relies on imports of food and agricultur-
al products, as well as other consumer goods (household chemical products, 
clothes, etc.). For this reason, trade is still one of the key sectors of the regional 
economy. EU firms may also seek business opportunities in the development of 
the exclave’s harbour, since it offers a chance for co-operation on modernising 
the ports (for example, construction and service contracts), and for the use of 
water transport on a broader scale in the future.
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More opportunities for EU firms to become engaged in the region are also of-
fered by the ongoing modernisation of the utilities and housing sector in Kalin-
ingrad oblast, which has become necessary due to the rising prices of energy 
and utility services in the exclave. The demand for materials and goods (in-
cluding gas and water meters), construction services, energy-saving technolo-
gies and renewable sources is growing in Kaliningrad oblast. EU exports and 
investments could get greater support if implementing the guidelines of the 
Partnership for Modernisation at both the EU-Russia level and in bilateral re-
lations between individual member states and Russia.
Tourism could be another area where co-operation could become closer in the 
future, although Russian shortcomings in this area are also enormous. This 
sector is underinvested regarding both accommodation and service facilities, 
and the tourist attractions need to be modernised, renovated or reconstructed.
Another effective instrument of support for EU business in the exclave is the 
operation of chambers of commerce and industry (predominantly German), 
consulates (especially the economic departments) and associations of foreign 
investors in the exclave. For this reason, it is essential to continue collecting and 
disseminating information on opportunities for economic co-operation with 
this region (for example, by creating websites). It is also important for busi-
ness circles to organise presentations of offers from EU firms, which makes it 
easier for contractors to establish co-operation with them; direct contacts still 
play the main role in Russia. Co-operation can also be facilitated by spreading 
knowledge about the region and its residents, which would stress their open-
ness to contacts and co-operation with their neighbours from the EU.
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